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NATURE AND EFFECTS OF CONSENT WITH RESPECT TO
THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND THE RIGHT TO PHYSICAL AND
MENTAL INTEGRITY IN THE MEDICAL FIELD:
CRIMINAL AND PRIVATE LAW ASPECTS*
J.-G. CASTEL**

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to analyze the nature and effects of a
patient's or subject's consent to therapeutic and non-therapeutic treatment and research in Canadian criminal law, and in the private law of
Quebec and the common law provinces, and to propose guidelines for
possible legislation.
The effect of the victim's consent to an illicit act is the basic
question. The scope of this inquiry is both general and particular, since it
covers general principles concerning the effect of the victim's consent to
an act which is illicit under Canadian criminal law or private law and
the application of these principles in the case of an individual's right
to life and physical and mental integrity with respect to treatment
and experiments of a therapeutic and non-therapeutic nature.
The article is divided into three parts. Part I deals with a definition of
consent, an analysis of its elements, especially the notion of "informed"
consent, and its effects on the crimininal law and private law in general.
Part II is devoted to the rights to life and physical and mental integrity.
Here, the general principles are applied specifically to therapeutic and
non-itherapeutic treatment and research. Part III contains some conclusions as well as some proposals for reform.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(A) Nature of Some of the Questions to be Analyzed
The effect of the victim's consent upon a criminal or private offence is
a question which arises quite often, especially in the medical field. Is the
victim's consent a justification for a criminal or tortious (or delictual) act
or omission that has caused him injury? Should the victim's consent be
effective with respect to all types of illicit acts or omissions?
When an act or omission is punished by the penal law, it means that
this act or omission is of concern to the State, or to society in general, in
other words, it is against public policy. Should the victim's consent justify
or excuse such act or omission and make it licit as, for instance, in the
case of self-defense? This raises the question whether in Canada the
Roman maxim volenti non fit injuriais a general principle of the criminal
as well as of the private law. This does not appear to be the case in the
criminal law as, historically, the maxim was only applicable to the
private delict or tort called "injuria"' which involved the infringement of
private rights that could be waived by the victim.
The victim's consent is not a general principle to be found in the
Canadian Criminal Code although it is mentioned in several sections of
This article is based on a study prepared forthe Canada Law Reform Commission. The views expressed here
do not represent in any way those ofthe Commission.
*° of Osgo de [fall Law School, Toronto.
1.Digest. Book XLVII. Tit. 10. Law 1, 5.
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the Code.2 The private law in force in the common law provinces is also
silent on the question although resort is had to the maxim volenti non fit
injuria. In Quebec, however, 3the Civil Code contains provisions dealing
with some aspects of consent.
Quite often society is confronted with cases where the victim has
consented to illicit acts which may have caused him some irreparable
injury at least in an objective sense. For instance, a husband, at the
request of his wife who is dying of an incurable disease, shortens her life.
A person gives some blood to the Red Cross, or requests an operation to
improve his or her looks, or gives a kidney to his brother or sister.
Objectively speaking, these acts may amount to homicide or assault. Yet
should the victim's consent excuse the husband, nurse or surgeon
performing such an illicit act?
To what extent does the victim's consent affect the application of the
criminal or private law? Should every illicit act sanctioned by the
Criminal Code be deemed against the public policy of the State so that the
victim's consent to it would be no valid excuse or justification?
(B) Definitions and Legal Nature of Consent
1. Definitions
Several definitions of consent may be given. For instance, Glanville
Williams4 has defined consent in layman's terms in the following
manner:
[C]onsent is the opposite of objection; it includes states of mind ranging from eager
desire at the one extreme to passive and reluctant acquiescence at the other. . . .In
general it may be said that if an adult has an opportunity to oppose an act done in
respect of him, and if with knowledge of the facts he decides not to oppose it-certainly
if he positively desires it-he consents to it.

The Oxford English Dictionary also defines consent in layman's terms
as a "voluntary agreement to or acquiesence in what another proposes or
desires; compliance, concurrence, permission".5 However, the law has
superimposed its own stipulations as to what amounts to consent in law,
who can give a legally recognized consent and what can validly be
consented to.
Fahmy Abdou 6 defines consent as the permission given by a private
individual7 to one or more persons to do an act of a private nature that is
forbidden by the positive penal or private law, or to abstain from doing an
act of a private nature that is required by the positive penal or private law
which infringes or takes away a right (personal right or property right)
protected by law which belongs to the person who gives such permission.
Prima facie, it seems difficult to accept the view that since illicit acts
are defined by the legislator, a private individual can exempt another
from the application of the criminal or private law. Where public policy is
involved, it cannot be disregarded. No individual should be able to render
licit that which is intrinsically illicit. When the social order is at stake,
the offender must be punished even if the victim absolved him. To give
2. E.g., Criminal Code, as. 14, 143, 244 discussed infra.

3.Civ. C., arts. 19 to 22, 984, 988, 991-1000, and see infra.
4. Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1961) 772.

5. (1971).
The word derives from the latin cam "with" and sentire
"tofeel" or "to think".
6. Le consentement de la victime (1971), 35.

7. A public official cannot consent to an illicit act being committed against the State although the State or one
of its representatives may give such a consent as a private person. This view is based upon the distinction
between acta jure gestionia and arta jure imperii.
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some effect to consent, it must be understood that each illicit act violates
a private as well as a public interest, the latter, a subjective State right.
When this is the case, the victim cannot exonerate the offender. However,
where the State's interest is solely to protect the victim, consent should be
effective as such interest in upholding the law is only indirect. Where the
State's interest is direct, the victim's consent is immaterial as the illicit
act also violates a fundamental right of the State.
2. Seifinflicted Injury-Pactumne dolus praesteturExculpatory Clauses
It should be rioted that the victim's consent differs from self-inflicted
injury or death (auto-lsion) which is not punishable and the pactum ne
dolus praestetur or exculpatory clause as in certain cases the legislator
may wish to protect a person against his own wishes.8 The reason why
self-inflicted death or injury is not punished in many countries is based
on the view that a person cannot be both the active and passive subject of
the offence. The victim cannot enjoy the right to life and be obligated by
such right. In other words an individual does not have legal obligations
towards himself. He cannot be at the same time the offender and the
victim.
In the case of mayhem or an attempt to commit suicide, the State may
have a direct interest in protecting the victim although, in Canada,
attempted suicide is no longer an offence.9
The pacturn ne dolus praesteturor exculpatory clause is an agreement
between one or more persons prior to an intentional wrongful or illicit act
whereby the offender will be exonerated from civil or criminal liability or
both. In many countries such an agreement is against public policy and
void. If consent and the pacturn were the same, the victim's consent could
never be a valid defence.
In the case of consent, an individual permits an act which is illicit.
Thus, the unlawful character of the act is erased. The pacturn does not
erase the illicit character of the act. It is, rather, an anticipated pardon for
an illicit act to which the victim may not necessarily wish to be subjected,
whereas in the case of consent, the victim wishes the act or omission to
act to take place. Therefore, one must examine the substantial contents of
the victim's intention in order to determine whether it is a case of consent
that may be valid or a pactum which is void. To recognize the validity of
the pactum would incite individuals to commit offences. In the case of
consent, the injury or damage is no longer illicit whereas in the case of a
pactuin it is still illicit because it encourages violation of the law which is
against public policy, thus rendering the injury illicit.
3. Legal Nature
It is possible to assert that the victim's consent means that he is
renouncing in advance (a) his right to damages (private law aspect), or (b)
his right to lay an information or charge against the actor (criminal law
aspect), or both. However, since the victim's consent, when admitted,
renders that act licit, he cannot renounce a right that will never come into
existence. Furthermore, such a renunciation would be a pactum ne dolus
praesteturwhich may be illicit and void.
Ki.For instance in Canada, suicide which is self-inflicted death is not punishable but homicide on demand or
counselling or aiding suicide is: Criminal Code, as. 14, 224.
!..See Criminal Code, a. 225 repealed in 1972.
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Consent could also be considered as the transfer of the exercise of a
right by its beneficiary to another person, or a legal act of authorization
which is individualized, autonomous and of a material nature. These
various approaches seem to make it clear that the victim's consent is a
special autonomous type of legal obligation which must follow special
rules.
Personal or property rights are protected in different ways by the
penal law and the private law. Some rights are protected only so long as
the persons entitled to enjoy them do not allow them to be infringed or
destroyed. They are rights that may be disposed of or waived ("disponibles") very freely. Other rights are protected by law even against the
wishes of the persons entitled to enjoy them. They cannot be disposed of
or waived ("indisponibles"). Consent should be effective only with respect
to rights that may be disposed of or waived. Public policy determines the
nature of such rights.
To conclude, it would appear that the victim's consent consists in the
faculty recognized by the criminal law or the private law to the
beneficiary of a personal or property right to suspend vis A vis one or
more persons, the efficacy of a legal provision protecting this right. Since
the person entitled to enjoy a right or to infringe or destroy such a right
(consenting person) may give to another person (the recipient of consent)
permission to infringe or destroy such a right, consent should always be
revocable. In this sense consent is a unilateral act.
All penal rules are not necessarily imperative. The application of the
criminal law may, in some cases, depend upon the wishes of the victim.
Sometimes the Criminal Code incorporates the requirement of absence of
consent into the definition of the offence; 10 sometimes the absence of
consent is implied in the offence although it is not expressly mentioned in
the text. Thus, the victim's consent is not always contrary to the
imperative and obligatory nature of the legal rule.
Rights are not always protected against the wishes of those entitled to
enjoy them unless they are of general interest to the State and society. In
each society there exists a hierarchy in the protection of rights which
depends upon their social importance and the degree to which their
violation infringes public order. Some are protected against those who are
entitled to enjoy them, others only in so far as their beneficiaries do not
consent to such rights being infringed. In private law cases and in some
criminal cases, the application of the rules may depend upon the wishes
of an individual person, since the victim must bring the action or lay an
information. If the victim does not complain, a legal action may not
always be possible.
(C) Elements of Consent: "Informed" Consent
Since the victim's consent is essentially a unilateral juridical act with
some bilateral aspects, it is subject to the general rules applicable to
juridical acts in the common law provinces and in the civil law of
Quebec."' However, consent also differs from other juridical acts,-such as
contracts, as it has a special function to perform.
10. See infra.
It. Consent, in a strict sense, is a unilateral juridical act but "informed" consent within the medical context has
bilateral aspects since the physician may have a duty to inform the patient objectively, and even perhaps
subjectively, a duty to ensure that the patient understands, and a duty to continue to inform. See discussion
infra. I t ia not intended to review the common law and civil law rules pertaining to consent in the contractual
field. In Quebec, see Baudouin, LAs Obligations (1970), as. 71 et seq.
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1. Forms of Consent
It is well established in all legal systems that consent must be
exteriorized to have any effect. However, a formal declaration is not
necessary. A simple manifestation of the victim's intention is sufficient.
Thus, consent may be oral or written, express or implied. 12 Silence is
consent only if, objectively, it can be interpreted as a manifestation of the
will of the consenting person. Simple toleration is not necessarily consent.
Consent may be reluctantly given. This is important in the medical
field where consent must be "informed". Consent may also be presumed.
The presumption must be reasonable (as, for instance, in the case of
emergency operations), and reasonableness depends upon the circumstances. Consent must also be certain.
2. Formalities
No special formalities are required to express a valid consent.
However, where a person consents to disposal inter vivos of a part of his
body or submits to an experiment, the consent of such person (or in the
case of a minor capable of discernment, of those who are authorized by
law to consent on his behalf) must be in writing. 13 This may also be the
case with respect to consent to surgery, anaesthetics, or a diagnostic
test. 4
3. Conditions of Validity
Consent must validly be given. The general principles of the common
law and of the civil law of Quebec are applicable. However, in the
criminal law field it is suggested that the civil law or common law
distinction between an act that is void and one that is voidable (nullitt
relative ou absolue) should not prevail. Thus, an illicit act should not be
subject to retroactive ratification. Consent which infringed or destroyed
the right protected by law, must have existed at the time the act was
performed; to hold otherwise would be contrary to the essence of the
criminal law. Furthermore, from a juridical point of view, the victim's
consent would amount to a private pardon which is not legally
recognized.
4. Vices of Consent
In the private law field, consent must not have been vitiated by error,
fraud, violence or fear 5 especially moral violence, as for instance in the
case of a reluctant donor of a kidney transplant. In other words, consent
must be freely given.
In the criminal law field, consent must be freely given and not
extorted.' 6 The Criminal Code when dealing with sexual acts done in
private between consenting adults, provides in section 158 that.
158.(2) (b) a person shall be deemed not to consent to the commission of an act (i) if the

consent is extorted by force, threats or fear of bodily harm or is obtained by false and

fraudulent misrepresentations as to the nature and quality of the act, or . . .

12 Quoe. Civ. C., art. 988. Consent muy be implied from facts which could not be explained in its absence.
Baudouin, id., ss. 72 et seq.
13 E.g., Que. Civ. C., art. 20; Ontario Human Tissue Gift Act, 1971, S.O.. 1971, c. 83, s. 3. Similar provisions
exist in other provinces.
14, See e.g.. Quebec, regulation under the Health Services and Social Services Art, L.Q., 1971, c. 48, G.O.Q. Nov.
2f, 1972, vol. 104, no. 47, p. 10566, at pp. 101574
el seq, arts 3.2.3.1 and (.2.1. I. Ontario regulations under the
Public Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 178, as rn., R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 729, ss. 49, 49a.
15. See. e.g., Que. Civ. C.. arts. 991-101) dealing with the law (f obligations.
16. Se Perkins, Criminal Law 963-4 (2nd ed., 169); Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law 287 (:;rd ed., 1973); Russell
n Crime 678 (12tlh ed., 1964).
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This provision could be applied in other situations.
Therefore, consent under duress is no consent at all. Nor is mere
submission consent. 7 Fraud, however, negatives consent only if it
deceives the consenting person as to the identity of the accused or the
nature of the act.' 8 As stated per Hartt J. in R. v. Maurantonio:19
. . The general rule is that if deception causes a misunderstanding as to the nature of
the act itself there is no legally recognized consent because what happened is not that

for which consent was given, whereas consent induced by fraud is as effective as any
other consent if the deceit relates not to the thing done but merely to some collateral
matter.

Section 145 of the Criminal Code clearly states that it is rape when a
woman consents to sexual intercourse because the man impersonated her
husband. In the famous case of The Queen v. Clarence,20 a woman had
sexual intercourse with her husband who knew he was suffering from
gonorrhoea. The wife, who subsequently contracted the disease, claimed
that her consent had been obtained by fraud since she certainly would not
have consented had she known of her husband's condition. The husband
was charged with assault causing bodily harm but while the court agreed
that the conduct of Mr. Clarence left something to be desired, it
nevertheless held that his wife's consent had been valid since she was21 not
deceived as to the nature of the act itself, that is, sexual intercourse:
It seems to me that the proposition that fraud vitiates consent in criminal matters is not
true if taken to apply in the fullest sense of the word, and without a qualification .... If
we apply it in that sense to the present case, it is difficult to say that the prisoner was
not guilty of rape, for the definition of rape is having connection with a woman without
her consent; and if fraud vitiates consent, every case in which a man infects a woman or
commits bigamy, the second wife being ignorant of the first marriage, is also a case of
rape.
.. . The woman's consent here was as full and conscious as consent could be. It was not
obtained by any fraud either as to the nature of the act or as to the identity of the agent.
The injury done was done by a suppression of the truth. It appears to me to be an abuse
of language to describe such an act as an assault.

5. "Informed" Consent
In the medical field, for consent to be valid and effective, it must be
"informed". In civil law jurisdictions, this may be considered as an
application of the general principle that consent is of no effect when a
mistake or an error is the principal reason for consenting. 22 The difficulty
lies in the determination of the quality of the mistake or error that renders
a person's consent invalid in any factual situation.
In the common law provinces, "informed" consent, where no mistake
or error in consenting has taken place, pertains more to the preservation
of the physical integrity and personal liberty of the patient than the
absolution of the physician. Actually, mistake or error is usually not
involved in "informed" consent as a principal reason for consenting. It is
the non-disclosure which may or may not have caused the patient to
consent. The emphasis is not on the mistake or error of the patient
17.Perkins. id.at 711;Smith and Ilogan. id.tt 287; Russell, id.
at 109.
18. Smith and Hogan, id. at 287. For a discussion of the effect of fraud (n consent in American jurisprudence, see
Perkins, id.at 94-969.
19.1191i7). 65 D.,.R. (2d) 674 at 6HI (Ont. C.A.); see alo. IMaduc and Hird v. The Queen (1967), 61 D.L.R. f2d) 82

0sC.C.).
20. (1886). 22 Q.I1I 1).
2:4.
21. Id..
per Stephen ,J., at.4:1-41.

22. A distinction must he made between consent to the putient-physiciaan relationship and consent to treatment.
The evidence.f the former does not necessarily imply the existence of the latter.

19781

INFORMED CONSENT

although he may have misunderstood the information given to him, but
on the negligence of the physician in not disclosing, and whether this
caused the damage to the patient. Where there is a duty to disclose, lack of
disclosure vitiates the patient's consent.
The common and the civil law also appear to differ significantly in
their tests of causation. In Kelly v. Hazlett23 the Ontario court clearly
expressed the view that in the context of a claim based on negligence, it
must be determined whether the physician had a duty to disclose
definitive as well as collateral risks inherent in any proposed surgical
procedure. The proper scope of the disclosure depends upon the
circumstances. As to causation, the patient must satisfy the court that if
he had been properly informed of the risk involved in the surgical
procedure and had been made to understand it, he would have foregone
such procedure and hence not suffered the alleged damage.
In Canada, there are no general legislative provisions dealing with
"informed" consent. However, the Civil Code of Quebec states in article 20
that::

A. person of full age may consent in writing to disposal inter vivos of a part of his body
or submit to an experiment provided that the risk assumed is not disproportionateto the
benefit anticipated.
A. minor, capable of discernment, may do likewise with the consent of . . . provided
that no serious risk to his health results therefrom....

The words italicized seem to indicate that before a patient or subject's
conE.ent can be validly obtained, there is a duty to disclose or to inform
wheLher or not there is a serious risk to the health of the patient or
subject. This gives legislative support to the doctrine of "informed"
conf;ent in this area of human activities. The Ontario Human Tissue Gift
Act 1971, also speaks of a person able to make "a free and informed
decioion".24 It is submitted that the doctrine of "informed" consent should
be applied by the courts in all instances where the victim's consent is a
relevant consideration. Of course the type of information to be given
should vary depending upon the circumstances in which consent is given.
There are no set rules as to the requirements of "informed" consent,
also called legally "effective" consent. The courts in Canada, the United
States and England are not always in agreement on this question. It
seems quite obvious that "informed" consent should be viewed not as a
sing[e act but as a process of contracting, negotiating, and recontracting.
Informed consent, which involves comprehension of adequate information and autonomy of consent, is a continuing process throughout the
treatment or experiment. In the medical field, sufficient information must
be disclosed to the patient so that he can arrive at an intelligent opinion,
and t~he patient must agree to the intervention being performed.
By promoting trust and confidence between patient and physician, informed consent
requirements may thus advance rational decision making ....
The freedom to make
decisions for oneself carries with it the obligation to answer for the consequences of
those decisions.25

The literature on the subject of "informed" consent is immense.26 For the
23. (1976), 75 I).L.R. (3d) 5:36, 15 O.R. (2d) 290 (H.C.). See also, Mayrand, Linviolabilitt de la personae
humaine
(1975), 8.
24. Supra, n. 13, a. 3(l) and (2). There are other provisions dealing with the necessity of consent, see
for instance,

Ontario Regulation under the Public Hospital Act, R.R.O. 1970. Reg. 729, s. 49.

25. Capron, Informed Consent in CatastrophicDisease Research and Treatment. (1974), 123 U. of Pa.
L Rev. 340
at 365.
26. In Canada, see e.g., Dickens, Information for Consent in Human Experimentation (1974),
24 U. of T.
L.J. 381; Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment (1973), 1I Osgoode Hall L.J. 103.
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purpose of this article, an attempt will be made to restrict the discussion
to the essential points.
The courts have held that informed consent is a prerequisite to any act
27
involving risk to a patient or subject except in certain emergencies.
Thus, it seems that the physician has no automatic duty to inform every
patient who visits him before obtaining his consent. For instance, when
no treatment or experiment or special testing procedure is contemplated,
the patient's implied consent should be sufficient to allow the physician to
carry out a physical examination and to diagnose the patient's ailment.
The duty to inform is a continuing one of changing contents. The physician cannot disclose all the risks of treatment at the examination stage
because he may not know what these will be; however, when he does
know, he must disclose them.
Furthermore, mention should be made of the so-called therapeutic
privilege to withhold information. There is some information which the
physician is not required to disclose, such as the risks of contracting
serum hepatitis from blood transfusion. Information which would normally be given may also be withheld if it would be harmful or dysfunctional for a particular patient in his special circumstances. Finally, a
patient should be given information of his prognosis if he remains
untreated.
"Informed" consent with respect to therapeutic and non-therapeutic
treatment or experiments involves:
1. Competence of the patient or subject. This raises the question of
proxy consent in the case of minors or mentally incapable adults.
2. Knowledge of the definitive and collateral risks involved. 2 Since in
experimentation, by definition, some risks are unknown, it may be
difficult to meet this requirement.
3. Voluntariness or autonomy of consent. The patient or subject must
pressures, or under constraint 29 or
not be under covert or overt 30
consent.
to
momentarily unable
4. Freedom to withdraw consent and to discontinue participation in
the treatment, project or activity at any time without prejudice to
the consenting patient or subject.
The type of information that must be disclosed to the consenting
patient or subject and comprehended by him comprises:
(a) A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed and their
purposes, including identification of any procedures which are
experimental.
(b) A description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to
be expected.
(K.|t.): Kenny v. Lockwood, 11r:321 1 I.L.R. 507 (Ont. C.A.); Mulloy v. Hop
(1767), 95 E.R. FAM1
27, Slotier v, iker
Sang, I 1935] 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alta. App. Iiv.); Holushka v. The University of Saskatchewan (1965), 53 DL.R.
(2d) 4:19 (Sask. C.A.); Male v. Hop nans (1965).54 )l.L.R. (2d) 592 at 595,119661 1 O.R. 647 (H.C.), affd (19%7),
(4 D.I.R. (2d) 105. 119671 2 ).11. 457 (C.A.); Natanson v. Klin' 119911),186 Kan. 393, 350 P. 2d 1093 rehearing
denied 187 Kon. 186, 354 1'. 2d 670; Ilyrnan v. Jewish Chronic I)isease Hospital (1964), 42 Misc. 2d 427, 248
N.Y.S. 2d 245 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 818. rev'd (1965), 15 N.Y. 2d 317, 206 N.E. 2d
3138, 258 N.Y.S. 2d 397. Kelly v. Hazletl. supra, n. 23: Lepp v. Hopp (1977), 78 D.L.R. (3d), 35 (Ont. H.C.);
Cryderman v. Ringrose. 11977]:1 WW.R. 109 (Alta. ).C.); Redh! v. Hughes (1977), 78 D.L.R. (3d) 35, 160.R. (2d)
:.Iti (Ont. H.C.). McLean v, Weir. Goff and Royal Inland lHospital. 119771 .5 W.W.R. 609 (B.C.S.C.) at 623-627.
28. leehl v. Hughes, id.; Kelly v. Hazlert. supra, n. 2 at 564 (I).L.).). A valid consent involves both awareness of
the risk and assent to the pros:lwure; see also Waltz. Scheuneman. Informed Consent to Therapy (1970), 64
Nw. U. L. Rev. 628.
29. Bowauer v. Rowley Regis Corp., 119,141K.B. 476,
30. Beausoleil v. La Cornmuaule des S eurs de la ('harit:de la Providence (1964). 53 D.,.R. (2d) 65. 11965 1 Que.
t).11. :37.
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(c) A description of any benefits reasonably to be expected.
(d) A disclosure of any appropriate alternative that might be
advantageous for the patient or subject.
(e) An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures.
(f) Comprehension by the patient or subject Does the patient or
subject understand what will be done to him, what risks he will
face, and what benefits he or society may derive from the
treatment or experiment?
"I iformed" consent promotes individual autonomy, protects the
patient or subject's status as a human being and reduces the likelihood of
misleading or overbearing the patient or subject. It also encourages
profei3sional self scrutiny thereby avoiding thoughtless disrespect of
patients or subjects and helps promote rational decision making.3'
The amount of information that the physician must provide should
vary according to the particular facts. This depends upon whether the
treatment selected is a standard, well-established procedure involving
minimal risks, or a procedure that is experimental involving greater ones.
The .iskier the procedure, the more complete must be the patient's or
subject's knowledge and understanding.32 In such a case, there is a clear
duty -o inform and to obtain an express informed consent. The doctrine of
implied consent arising from the physician-patient relationship is not
sufficient.
In the field of medical research and experimentation the following
guidelines have been proposed:3 4
The person giving consent must be informed fully of the nature and purpose of
the
research
and of the procedures to be used, including identification of those
which are experimental, the possible attendant short or long term risks and procedures
discomforts,

the anticipated benefits to himself and/or others, any alternative methods of treatment,
expected duration of the study, and of his or her freedom to ask any questions and
to
withdraw at any time, should the person wish to do so. There must also be written
evidence of the process used for obtaining informed consent, including grounds
for belief

that the subject has understood the information given and has sufficient maturity
and
mental capacity to make such choices and formulate the requisite judgment to consent.
In addition, the person must have sufficient autonomy to choose, without duress,
whether or not to participate. Both the comprehension of information and the autonomy

of consent are necessary elements; to the extent that either of these is
in doubt, the
adequacy of informed consent may be in doubt.

These guidelines form part of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
applicable to all Department of Health, Education and Welfare grants
and contracts supporting research, development and related activities in
which human subjects are involved: .35
(c) 'Informed consent' means the knowing consent of an individual or
his legally
authorized representative, so situated as to be able to exercise free power
of choice
without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or
other form of
constraint of coercion. The basic elements of information necessary to
such consent

include:

(1) A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes,
including
identification of any procedures which are experimental;
(2) A description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to be
expected;
(3) A description of any benefits reasonably to be expected;
:11. Se, (apron. supra, n. 25 at 164-476: The Functions of Inforned ('onsnt. Kelly
v. Hazlett. supra, n. 23 at 556
(I).I,.It)
32.. Ribl v. Hughes, supra, n. 27.
3,. U.S.A.. Ied'ral Register, Vol. :1, No. 221, Nov. I6, 1973, p. :11740
and 45 C.P.R. § 46.3 (1974). See also
HIaluskhta v. Uniuersity of Saskatchewan and (rydernan v. Ringrose, supra,
n. 27.
Al5. 45 C.F'.. Public Welfare § 46,102 as of,uly I, 1977. &,1, also § 46.10.
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(4) A disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures that might be advantageous
for the subject;
(5) An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures; and
(6) An instruction that the person is free to withdraw his consent and to discontinue
participation in the project or activity at any time without prejudice to the subject.

In other words, information as to the nature, duration and purpose of
be given to the patient or subject
the treatment and experiment
36 must
before obtaining his consent.
If informed consent is lacking, or the physician has exceeded the
consent given by the patient, criminal or civil liability, or both may
falls within the provisions of sections 45 or 195 of
result unless the case
7
the Criminal Code.3
Again it should be emphasized that the validity of the patient's or
subject's consent can only be maintained by keeping his relevant
information up to date over the entire duration of the treatment or
experiment.
Unlike some American courts, Canadian courts have not attempted to
lay down very strict criteria with respect to the elements of "informed"
consent. Thus, a physician need not explain in detail the actual medical
techniques to be used so long as the patient fully understands the nature
of the treatment.38 The courts seem to favour a subjective rather than an
objective test in that the information to be given to the patient must
depend upon his particular condition and mentality; 39 to give the patient
too much information may impair his recovery. 40 However, in the area of
experimentation the courts will require stricter standards of disclosure.
This approach should also be used in the case of non-experimental
procedures.
42
In Kelly v. Hazlett Morden J. stated:
I take it to be the law in this jurisdiction that the duty to disclose the collateral risk
inherent in any proposed procedure is substantially a matter of medical judgment as
opposed to being one of absolute and invariable content unlike the law in some United
States jurisdictions where the duty is based upon the notion of what a reasonable
patient might be expected to wish to hear in order to make up his mind and that,
therefore, normally, the duty would be determined with the assistance of expert medical
evidence on what would be the proper scope of disclosure in the circumstances

presented. However, it has to be recognized that this test has both its practical and,
perhaps, its policy frailties. In some cases it may be difficult to distinguish, and separate
out, the matter of consequential or collateral risks from the basic nature and character
of the operation or the procedure to be performed. This may possibly have been the case
in Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan [(1965, 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436, 52 W.W.R. 6081.
The more probable the risk the more it could be said to be an integral feature of the
nature and character of the operation. Further, even if a risk is truly collateral, but still
material, it could be said that its disclosure is so essential to an informed decision to
undergo the operation that lack of such disclosure should vitiate the consent.

3(. See also Nuremberg Code, U.S. v. Brandt, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
lihumnals. 181-182; Declaration of Helsinki, 1964 as revised in 1975; American Medical Assoc,iation Guidelines

(1966); Medical Research Council of Canada, Ethics in Human Experimentation (1978).
3 D.L.R. 260 (N.S.S.C.). Note that the courts have gone quite
:7. As to emergencies see Marshall v. Curry, 119331
far in extending the scope of consent in order to allow for the physician's exercise of judgment Caron v.
Gagnon (930), fi8Que. SC. 15; E v. M (1939), 77 Que. S.C. 298; Bennett v. C. (1907-08), 7W.L.R. 740 (Man.):
Lf[rOniere v. Hopital Maisonneutie, 1 19631 Que. S.C. 467.

119711 2 O.R. 103 (H.C.). See also Mayrand,
38. Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital. et al. (1970), 17 D.L.R. (:3d) 1:19,
supra, n. 2:3at 38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Se Male v. llopmans. supra, n. 27, (C.A.); Kenny v. Lockwood. supra, n. 27.
Male v. Hupmans, supra, n. 27. No remote warnings are necessary, McLean v. Weir et al., supra, n. 27 at 627.
See Halushka v. The University of Saskatchewan. supra, n. 27: Cryderman v. Ringrose. supra, n. 27.
Supra. n. 2:1at M5 (l).l.R.). Also McLean v. Weir et al., supra, n. 27 at 627.
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To this, Haines J. added that"..
it is not only the probability of a
particular risk but the severity of its realized consequences which controls
its characterization as an 'integral feature of the nature and character of
the operation'. A description of the procedure without clear reference to
those risks is misleading as to the nature and quality of the procedure; a
consent given in ignorance of that central and salient property of the
'43
surgery is no consent at all."

It might also be emphasized that "any doctrine of informed consent
must take account of the limitations on patient-subjects' capacity to make
intelligent and insightful choices. Some of these constraints are inherent
in the intellectual faculties, psychological forces, and social pressures
affecting the participants, while others result from personal, professional,
and societal judgments about the scope of the authority which patientsubjects should be allowed to exercise". 44
6. Who May Consent
The person entitled to the enjoyment of a right may consent to its
infringement. However, he must be capable of consenting, and the
informed consent must be freely given.
In the province of Quebec, as well as in the common law provinces,
there are rules dealing with capacity to consent. As noted previously,
article 20 of the Civil Code provides that a person of full age may consent
to the disposal inter vivos of a part of his body or submit to an
experiment. A minor, capable of discernment may do likewise with the
consent of the person having the paternal authority and of a judge of the
Superior Court. This rule is more restrictive than those prevailing with
respecl to other acts to be performed on behalf of minors or insane
45
person s.

In Ontario, the Human Tissue Gift Act 1971, allows a person who has
attained the age of majority and is mentally competent to consent to the
removal from his body of the tissue specified in his consent. 6 The Ontario
Act does not recognize a consent given by a person who has not attained
the age of majority or is not mentally competent, although in certain
cases the physician may still be protected. 47 It is doubtful whether the
courts would recognize a consent given by the parent or guardian or
committee of a person who is a minor or insane when the procedure
contemplated is of no benefit to the patient or subject. However, with
respect to other matters, especially medical treatment, consent can be
validly given by others on behalf of the minor or insane person4 8 or by the
minor himself in certain circumstances. 49
Section 158(b)(1) of the Criminal Code which deals with buggery,
bestiality and acts of gross indecency committed in private between
43 Reibl v. Hughes, supra, n. 27 at 42 (D.L.R.). See also Lepp v. Hopp, supra, n. 27, where the
court quoted
Halushka to the effect that it is the duty of the physician to give a fair and reasonable explanation
of the
proposed treatment including the probable effect and any special or unusual risks.
44. Capron, supra, n. 25 at 376.
45. See Que. Civ. C., arts 290, 337, 349, 984-987.
46. Supra, n. 13,u. 3."Tisue includes an organ, but does not include any skin, bone, blood, blood
constituent or
other tissue that is replaceable by natural processes of repair." Similar legislation exists in other
common law
provinces.
47. See s. 1(2).
48. But see Ihksth v. Toronto General Hospital (1910), 17 O.W.R. 118.
49. See Johnston v. Wellesley
Hospital et a/., supra, n. 34; R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 729, s. 49(c): Infants Act. R.S.B.C.
196.W c. 193,s. 23: Uniform Medical Consent of Minors Act, 1975 Proceedings Uniform Law Conference
of
Caoada 162.

ALBERTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

husband and wife or consenting adults, provides that a person shall be
deemed not to consent to the commission of such an act:
(ii) if that person is, and the other party to the commission of the act knows or has good
reason to believe that that person is feeble-minded, insane, or an idiot or imbecile.

This subjective test should be extended to all criminal law offences
where consent is relevant. At present, the test in other areas of the
criminal law is an objective one since the consent of children and mental
incompetents is no consent at all.50 Therefore, if a thirteen-year-old girl or
a mentally retarded person consents to any sexual 5 act with a man, her
consent will not absolve him from criminal liability.
It should be pointed out that a minor or insane person although
incapable of giving a consent that is legally binding, may still express his
natural will. Thus, in the medical field, it may be advisable to obtain the
minor's consent in addition to that of his parent or guardian. While
parental consent in the case of children approaching the age of majority
may be a necessary condition of treatment, it may not be a sufficient
condition.
An interesting question is whether a person legally capable of
discernment,5 2 should be able to give a valid consent although he is not of
age from the private law point of view. In other words, should capacity to
consent be related to degrees of penal responsibility? The answer should
be negative as criminal responsibility and legal capacity are two different
matters. Capacity deals with the legal element of the offence; imputability
refers to the responsibility of the alleged offender.
7. The Recipient of Consent
The recipient of consent need not be capable since consent is basically
a unilateral juridical act. Therefore, he does not have to accept it or even
know of its existence. However, where consent does not render the act licit
but only diminishes criminal or civil responsibility its existence should be
known to the person to whom it is given.
8. Object, Consideration,or Cause of Consent
The object of consent includes the act or omission and its effects. Such
object must not be illicit or against public policy. For instance, it must not
be contrary to an express provision of the law especially where consent to
the act or
omission is clearly prohibited as in the case of consent to
5 s1
homicide.
This is also the case when the act is prohibited by law even if done by
the person entitled to enjoy the right to be infringed, or where consent
refers to some act or omission that is illicit although it is of such a nature
that it requires the victim's consent.5 4 The consideration or cause for
consenting must not be illicit.
9. When Must Consent be Given?
Consent must be given before the act or omission5 and must exist at

the time of such an act or omission. Until then it can be revoked. As noted
50. P'e'rkiiis or (CriminalLaw 12nl ed., 19) 110.
51. See''C riminal (ode, ss. 140,149.
52. (Criminal C.ode, sm. 12,13.
5:3 (ri
itod C.de., s. 14.
54. N t, that the sale of tissi, forit tralspliint or tiny hbody partsis proihibited. Que. Civ. C.. art. 20 (unless it is
sisiceptihle
i , rexeni.ration) ()ntirli. Iiuman Tissue Gift Act 1971, sspra, n. 13, s. 10.
55. Mlanhville Williams, supra, it. I at 770.
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prev:iously, consent cannot be given after the act and have a retroactive
effect. It is at the time when the act was committed or the omission
took
place that the illicit character of the act must be ascertained. It cannot
be
made licit retroactively.
It is a question of fact whether consent was given with respect to
a
particular point in time, or before or after a particular point in time.
If
consent was given during the act or omission, it justifies only that
part of
the act or omission to act which took place after consent was given.
This
is important as in order to know whether or not an act or omission
is an
offence, one must consider all the surrounding circumstances at the
time
it tock place.
When consent is given after the act or omission it is a pardon. It has
nothing to do with the existence of the offence. However, consent after
the
act should be taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing.
10. Revocation of Consent
Consent may always be revoked before or during the act or omission
to
act.
When by virtue of a contract, the person has agreed to give his consent
and later revokes it, the act accomplished without consent is
illicit
although the recipient of the consent may be entitled to damages
for
breach of contract.
Revocation of consent may be expressed or implied. However, in the
case of disposal inter vivos of a part of the body or submission
to an
experiment revocation must be in writing. 56
(D) Effects of Consent
1. General
It may be argued that when consent is recognized by law as valid,
renders the forbidden act licit. Consent takes away the illicit character it
of
the act which no longer violates the criminal law or the private law.
The
act co'nsented to by the victim can be performed without the recipient
of
the ccnsent committing a criminal offence or a civil wrong or both. 7
The owner of the right is not injured legally although he may still
be
injured materially. Consent does not remove the subjective or
moral
element of the act but only its objective or legal element. It may
also
remove one of the essential elements of the offence.
Artother view is that, depending upon the extent to which the victim's
consent is effective, consent is a cause of justification, vis a vis an
act
which, without his consent, would be an illicit act.
Since the act consented to is no longer illicit, civilly or penally, no legal
sanctions are in order. A civil or criminal action is not available
to the
injured party (the victim) or the State. Perhaps consent should
have
different effects depending upon the circumstances.
As a voluntary juridical fact, the victim's consent takes away
the
protection to which he is entitled and gives the recipient of the consent
the right to do the act consented to. In other words, the victim's consent
could be considered as a sort of legal title which would enable its recipient
to infringe or destroy a right belonging to the person who gives
the
5 i.

Que. Civ. C., art. 20.

57. Rather than consent rendering an illicit act licit, one could regard
the act and consent operating as a sort of
gestalt much like actus reus and mons rea, so that where there is the
act and consent, the act is licit.
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consent. However, such a juridical fact is also a juridical act. It is an act
which is penally and civilly important since it takes away the illicit
character of the material fact (that is, the damaging act).
In the medical field it may be inadvisable to consider consent as a sort
of legal title for the purpose of protecting a patient. It may be better to
consider consent as a privilege within which the physician operates.
Finally, it is also essentially a unilateral act as it is the sole will of the
consenting person which creates it and as a consequence makes licit the
act which was done against him. However, in certain cases especially in
the medical field, it has a bilateral aspect as the recipient of the consent
must actively participate in obtaining an informed consent. This does not
give it a consensual or contractual aspect, but only insures that the
consent is validly given so as to protect the recipient of the consent.
(a) The Limits of the Effect of Consent
Penal law sanctions offences in the interest of society as well as in the
interest of individuals. It is generally supportive of public order. The
penal action is brought in the name of the Crown upon the laying of a
public or private information. Once the action has begun, the victim's
withdrawal from the case does not affect its prosecution (except in cases
where the victim's complaint is the sole basis for the prosecution).
Normally, the victim's consent has no effect on the action by the Crown.
But does it have an effect on the elements of the offence itself, that is, on
the very existence of the offence? If the victim's consent destroys the
illicit character of the criminal act, can it be considered as a legal
justification?
Consent does not erase the act but modifies its juridical nature. As
noted above, consent renders licit an act which was illicit. The problem
which faces the legislator and the courts is whether consent should be
effective with respect to all legally protected rights.
It could be argued that there is no general principle of law in existence
in Canada with respect to the limits of consent. Each case is sui generis
depending upon the contents of the applicable law and the surrounding
circumstances. However, what should be done when the law is silent?
(b) Theories
Several theories 58 may be advanced with respect to the effect and scope
of consent:
(1) Consent has no effect unless expressly provided by law. 59 This
theory is not necessarily correct as the law cannot foresee
everything. When the legislator expressly provides for the effect of
consent he has a special purpose. This does not mean that in other
cases consent should have no effect.
(2) Consent is effective except where the legislator has decided
otherwise.8 0 This theory is dangerous as it is too wide.
(3) Consent is effective only with respect to rights that can be waived
or infringed. Some rights cannot be waived as for instance the
right to life, the right to physical or mental integrity; others may be
waived, as for instance, property rights. This theory may be too
restrictive because consent should be effective with respect to some
58. For tin analysis of theme theories see Fahnny Abdou, n. 6 at 8:1 et seq.
59. As in Criminal Code, s. 244.
6). As in Criminal Code, s. 14.
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acts involving the physical or mental integrity of a person, for
instance, the case of a surgical operation for the benefit of the
patient.
(4) Consent is effective depending upon whether or not a person may
be able to waive certain rights. This approach begs the question
and is closely akin to the preceding theory.
(5) Consent is effective only in those cases where by law the
prosecution of the alleged offender depends exclusively upon the
victim's complaint. This view is too restrictive as in many legal
systems the victim's complaint is not necessary.
(6) Consent is effective depending upon the motives of the person
doing the act. Since suicide is not illicit, a person should be able to
ask someone else to kill him provided the motive of the recipient of
the consent is morally, legally and socially not reprehensible."
The right must be one that can be waived. However, if this is the
case, motive should be irrelevant. If the right cannot be waived, 62
motive is equally irrelevant, although the responsibility of the
recipient of the consent may be lessened and he may incur a lesser
penalty. Therefore, a theory of consent based upon the motive of
the actor does not seem to be helpful.
,(7) Consent is effective only with respect to cases where one may
waive a right by a valid contract. If such contract is illicit or
against public policy, consent is not effective. For instance, blood
transfusions, skin grafts are not against public policy. However,
when is a contract against public policy? Are all types of
exculpatory clauses against public policy?
(8) Consent is effective depending upon its legal nature. Being a
juridical act, it must not be against public policy. We are back to
the basic question, when is consent effective?
To conclude, in the absence of an express general provision in the
Criminal Code dealing with consent, it is impossible to state with any
degree of accuracy when consent is legally effective.
'It should be recognized that whereas some of the rights to be enjoyed
by human beings can be waived, others cannot. In other words, the
protection and enforcement of some rights depend upon the victim's will.
A right whose infringement does not immediately and directly injure the
State can be waived. Thus, the State may intervene only where the victim
has not consented to their infringement. Criteria must be found in order
to determine which rights the State protects directly and those it protects
indirectly. Such a search involves the scope of the maxim volenti non fit
injuria.
In some Cases, the penal law protects the rights of individuals
objectively, without taking into consideration the victim's consent, on the
basis of the public interest so as to protect society in general. The
prevention or punishment of offences against the public good does not
depend upon the will of the victim. These rights are not subjective rights;
they are objectively protected rights because society must be protected. In
such a case consent can never be effective.
When the right is subjective, consent is effective only if it is a right
that may be waived.
I1..

.',
ee

62. kg..

v . Criminal (od, m. 224.
Crimninal (,di, m. 14 (rilht to life).

h,,
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Furthermore, the right to be waived should be an individual right (of
which an individual may be the subject) and not a collective right (of
which society as a whole is the subject). With respect to collective rights,
consent cannot remove the illicit character of the act.
In the case of subjective individual rights, some are of a public and
some are of a private nature. Consent to the infringement of some public
rights (for example, political rights, civil rights) is not effective but may
be effective with respect to the right of personal freedom. More generally,
is it possible to consent to the infringement of rights guaranteed in the
6 3
Bill of Rights?
Even if the subjective individual right is of a private nature, this does
not mean that consent will be effective. The law may impose some limits
to the exercise of private rights. It would seem that not all private rights
should be able to be waived. The victim's consent should not be effective
with respect to rights which he must exercise or in cases where he is
forbidden to inflict injury upon himself. If the victim cannot do the act, a
fortiori his consent should not be effective to allow another person to do
that act (nemo plus juris transferrepotest quam habet ipse). What criteria
can be used in order to determine whether or not a private subjective right
can be waived so that consent will or will not be effective?
Consent should be effective and take away the illicit character of an
act vis A vis all private, individual, subjective rights except where the
exercise of this right is of a direct and immediate interest to the State
independently of the will of the individual involved.
When the State sanctions an attempt against the integrity of human
life and allows the subject of the right to life to bring a civil action or lay
an information, its aim is to protect him and to allow him to enjoy his life.
However, for the State, the life of this citizen represents an asset. The
State has a direct and immediate interest in protecting and preserving
such life because the consenting person is a potential producer of goods,
of children, etc. Here the interest of the State is greater than the interest
of the individual. Consent of the subject of the right is effective and
renders legal its infringement only when the right does not involve a
direct and immediate social usefulness for the State. In such a case, the
interest of the State to protect the consenting person is indirect. The State
only wants to make sure that such person is able to exercise the right in
question. When the right is individually private of itself, independent of
the individual, and of immediate and direct social interest to the State,
consent should not be effective as the State not only wishes to ensure that
the individual
can enjoy it but also wishes to preserve its social
64
usefulness.
The difficulty lies with the determination of those private rights in
which the State has a direct and immediate social interest and those in
which it has not. Which rights are protected and which are not?
(c) Criteria
Fahmy Abdou6 5 is of the opinion that consent to the infringement of
an individual subjective private right should be effective and remove the
illicit character of the act:
63. R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III, K. i(a).
64. Faihmy Ahdou, n. 6, Ch 111, 81 el seq.
65. Supra, n. 6 at 139-140.
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(1) in cases where the effect of consent is specifically indicated in the
law, or where it is to be derived from the definition of the offence or
an analysis of its elements in the relevant law. In some cases, the
law itself indicates that absence of consent is an element of the
offence so that if the victim consented to the infringement of the
right, there is no offence.
(2) where the law is silent on the question of the effect of consent and
no direct State or social interest is involved. Also, often the nature
of the offence is such that absence of consent is one of its elements,
although not specifically mentioned in the text of the law, so that if
consent exists, there is no offence.
'3) in the case of a private property right.
1:4) in the case of private rights and the right to liberty where a civil
action can only be brought by the victim or upon his complaint in
the case of a criminal prosecution.
(5) in cases where the infringement of the right constitutes a minor
offence.
In order to determine whether or not a right can be waived or
infringed, it is necessary to examine the legal provision which protects
the right as it may indicate the basic social interest involved.
(ii) CriminalLaw
:[n some types of offence, absence of consent on the victim's part is
essential. A finding of consent negates the offence. An example of this
type of offence is rape:
143. A male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with a female
person...
(a) without her consent....

The non-criminal act of sexual intercourse becomes a serious criminal
offence by the lack of consent on the part of the victim. Similarly,
kidnapping must be against the victim's will.66 In the case of child
stealing, the consent of the child is no defence, but the consent of the
parent or guardian is a bar to
conviction provided, of course, that there is
67
no raud or duress involved.
Common assault and assault causing bodily harm have been the
subject of much discussion with regard to whether or not consent to the
infliction of injury will be recognized as a defense. In Canada, section 244
of ithe Criminal Code expressly states that absence of consent is an
essential element of the offence:
244. A person commits an assault when (a) without the consent of another person or
with consent, where it is obtained by fraud, he applies force intentionally to the person
Of the other, directly, or indirectly.

The English courts have been concerned with the question of whether
or not an alleged assault constitutes conduct criminal in itself which
could not be excused by the victim's consent. Canadian courts, being
faced with the specific statutory requirement of absence of consent, have
approached the problem differently. The finding of consent negates the
offence of assault. However, it must be determined whether the acts
exceeded the scope of the victim's consent. If they did, they constitute
66. Criminal Code, a. 247.
67. Perkins, supra, n. 16 it 182.
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assault. Although strictly speaking, the offences of common assault and
assault causing bodily harm belong to the category of offences which
require an absence of consent, they have undergone a judicial
metamorphosis and, for the purposes of this article, belong more properly
to offences where consent may or may not be a defence, a category which
will be dealt with separately.
As mentioned earlier, there are certain offences to which no one can
give legal consent. In effect this means that the law holds certain values
to be more important than free choice or individual freedom. An example
of this is the sanctity of life. Section 14 of the Criminal Code provides
that:
No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted upon him, and such consent does
not affect the criminal responsibility of any person by whom death may be inflicted
upon the person by whom consent is given.

Apart from murder, this section covers suicide pacts and euthanasia.
Despite the controversy surrounding euthanasia and recent decisions
such as that rendered by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the famous
case of Karen Quinlan, Ta euthanasia continues to be culpable homicide
in Canada by virtue of section 14.
Consent has long been held to be no defence to "unnatural acts", such
as buggery or bestiality, often grouped together under the heading of
sodomy. In England, section 12 of the Sexual Offences Act of 1956
68
specifies that both parties, even if consenting, are equally guilty.
However, if one of the parties is a child, he will not be considered
responsible.6 9 In Canada, consenting parties over twenty-one years of age
are free from liability but the mere fact that one of the parties is under
twenty-one will not automatically rule out consent as a defence.70 In the
case of children, consent is no defence to a charge of having sexual
under the age of fourteen, or indecent assault on
intercourse with a female
71
a child under fourteen.
Duelling, once a popular activity in the 17th and 18th centuries, began
to be punished in the courts in the 19th century. 72 Loss of face became to
be regarded as of lesser importance than preserving human lives. Despite
the outdated nature of the offence, duelling remains an offence by virtue
of section 72 of the Criminal Code. This section, however, covers only the
actual agreement or challenge to have a duel. If a duel is held and death
or injury results, the perpetrator of the offence would be open to criminal
prosecution, and the consent of his opponent would be of no avail to him.
Mayhem or maiming, was at one time an offence under the common
law. Russell defines maining as "a bodily hurt whereby a man is rendered
less able in fighting, to defend himself or to annoy his adversary". 73 The
injury must not be one which simply disfigures the man, such as cutting
off his ear or his nose. Since the policy behind the offence was that the
67a. ;t5r A. (2d) 647 (1976).
68. Russell, supra, n. 16 at 678. Also Smith and Hogan, supra, n. 16 at 357.
69. Russell, supra, n. 16 at 678.

70. R. v. St. Pierre (1964), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 489, 3 O.R, (2d) 642 (Ont. C.A.).
71. See Criminal Code, s. 140, 148. Without s. 140, by virtue of a. 7(3) tin accused could argue the child's common
law capacity to consent as a defence to the charge against him, In England, the Sexual Offences Act 1967
incorporated a similar provision whereby it is not an offence for two men to commit buggery or gross

indecency, provided that both parties consent to it, both are twenty-one years old or older, and the act is
committed in private. However, it continues to be an offence for a man to commit buggery with a woman,
despite her consent.
72. See discussion in Glanville Williams, Consent and Public Policy 119621 Cr. L. Rev. 74 at 77-78.
73. Russell, supra, n. 16 at 625.
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King would be deprived of able men to serve him in the army, the injury
had to render the man less able for fighting."4 The consent of the victim
was of course no defence. Today, maiming is to be found in section 228 of
the Criminal Code:
228. Everyone who, with intent
(a) to wound, maim or disfigure any person,
causes bodily harm in any way
to any person, . is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable for imprisonment
for 14 years.

As recently as 1962, in the case of R. v. Schultz, 75 the Supreme Court of
Alberta defined maiming as injuring a person so that he is less able to
fight and defend himself. Consent is not mentioned in the section. If it is
proven that the person intended to wound his victim or to maim him,
presumably the consent or its absence on the part of the victim is
irrelevant. Here the State has a direct interest in protecting the right to
physical integrity.
It has long been held that consent is no defence to a charge of assault
arising from a prize fight. While the law on this subject has been very
clear, the definition of the expression "prize fight" has not always been
so. ]n Smith and Hogan on CriminalLaw, it is defined as "a fight without
gloves, or otherwise likely to cause more serious injury than boxing under
the Queensbury rules". 75 In section 81(2) of the Criminal Code, a prize
fight is defined as:
...an encounter or fight with fists or hands between two persons who have met for
that purpose by previous arrangement made by or for them, but a boxing contest
between amateur sportsmen, . . . or any boxing contest held with the permission or
under the authority of an athletic board or commission or similar body established by or
under the authority of the legislature of a province for the control of sport within the
province, shall be deemed not to be a prize fight.

On the authority of this section, anyone who participates in any way
in a prize fight is guilty of an offence punishable by summary conviction.
Probably the most difficult category of offences is that where consent
may or may not be a defence, depending upon the circumstances of each
case. The offence most frequently discussed under this heading is that of
assault, which properly includes the offence of battery. As mentioned
previously, courts in England and in Canada have taken slightly
different views with respect to the effect of consent.
Among the many cases that deal directly or indirectly with the
question of consent as a valid defence to a charge of assault, the two that
most readily come to mind are The Queen v. Coney and Others,77 and R.
v. Donovan.75 Although Coney was concerned with the question of
whether or not a mere spectator at a prize fight was guilty in law of an
assault, the case has become famous for the comments it contains as to
the niature of an assault. Cave J. said:79
The true view is, I think, that a blow struck in anger, or which is likely or is intended to
do corporeal hurt, is an assault, but that a blow struck in sport, and not likely, nor
intended to cause bodily harm, is not an assault, and that, an assault being a breach of
the peace and unlawful, the consent of the person struck is immaterial.
74. Id. Alsot Smith and Hogan, supra, n. 16 at 288.

75. (19%2),133 C.C.C. 174, 38 C.R. 78 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.).
76. Supra, n. 16 at 287.288. Also see Williams, supra, n. 72 at 78.80 for a discussion of prize fights.
77. (1882). 8 Q. .I). 534.
78. 119:41 2 K.B. 498. 50 T.L.R. 656.
79. Supra, n. 77 at 539.
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Cave J.'s approach centers on the true intent of the player and makes
mens rea a prerequisite to a conviction for assault. More importantly,
however, the above passage means that once the court has found that an
assault has taken place, consent is no defence. The intent of the player is
only relevant insofar as it determines whether or not his actions
constituted an assault in law.
In the same case, Stephen J. expressed this view:8 0
The principle as to consent seems to me to be this: When one-person is indicted for
inflicting personal injury upon another, the consent of the person who sustains the
injury is no defence to the person who inflicts the injury, if the injury is of such a nature,
or is inflicted under such circumstances, that its infliction is injurious to the public as
well as to the person injured.

Here we have the view that consent can be a defence to assault,
depending on the nature of the assault. The question to be asked is, what
circumstances will make the infliction of bodily harm injurious to the
public as well as to the victim? Stephen J. answers this question by
pointing out that "it is against the public interest that the lives and the
health of the combatants should be endangered by blows",81 and goes on
to say that public interest is further affected by the fact that prize fights
are "disorderly exhibitions, mischievous on many obvious grounds".8 2
Presumably then, while the activity during which injury was sustained
does not have to be of redeeming social value, neither must it be contra
bonos mores or more generally, against public policy. With respect to the
actual injury
to the person, it is the degree of the injury that is
83
important:
In cases where life and limb are exposed to no serious danger in the common course of
things, I think that consent is a defence to the charge of assault, even when
considerable force is used, as, for instance, in cases of wrestling, single stick, sparring
with gloves, football, and the like; but in all cases the question whether consent does or
does not take from the application of force to another its illegal character, is a question
of degree depending upon circumstances.

Here we have a totally different and, it is submitted, a better test than
that set out in Cave J.'s judgment. Instead of trying to decide whether or
not the person who struck the blow intended to harm his victim, we have
an approach whereby the actual injury sustained and the activity itself
are both analyzed in terms of their potential harm to the consenting
victim and society in general.
However, it is the approach of Cave J. which seems to have been
followed in R. v. Donovan, where it was held that if an act is unlawful in
itself, no amount of consent will render it lawful.8 4 "Unlawful" was
defined as follows:8 5
As a general rule, . . . it is an unlawful act to beat another person with such a degree of
violence that the infliction of bodily harm is a probable consequence, and when such an
act is proved, consent is immaterial.

The exceptions cited to this rule were such "manly diversions"8 6 as
contests which encourage the development of physical strength and
80. Supra, n. 77 at 549.
81, Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Supra, n. 78 per Swift J. at 507 (K.B.).
85. Id.
86. Id. ait508.
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skills. Blows inflicted in sport or play, where there was no intention to
cause harm, were also considered harmless. However, after saying that no
conhent will render an unlawful act lawful, Swift J. goes on to say that
"there are, however, many acts in themselves harmless and lawful which
become unlawful only if they are done without the consent of the person
affected".8 7 As Glanville Williams quite justly points out, this is:88
...nothing more than a tautology. The first three sentences say merely that if an act is
a crime irrespective of consent, then consent is no defence, while the last says that if the
act is a crime only when done without consent, then consent is a defence. In each case
the coriclusion is wrapped into the premises.

The issue before the court was not satisfactorily decided "merely by an
unsupported assertion that the act was unlawful". 89 We are therefore
forced to return to Coney as an authority. Thus, it appears that intent and
degree of force are cumulatively relevant to determine unlawfulness and
that intent is only relevant when the degree of force is below a certain
level acceptable in the circumstances.
In Canada, perhaps by virtue of section 244 which unequivocally
states that consent is a defence to assault, the courts have taken a
diffe.rent approach. This approach pays lip service to the requirements of
section 244, while at the same time it neatly sidesteps its possible
dangerous effects. In other words, in cases where the degree of bodily
harm inflicted on the victim is such that it would seem to be against
public policy to permit the conduct to go unpunished, the courts have
satisfied both the statutory requirement of section 244 and the public
conscience by asserting the following: consent is an absolute defence to a
charge of assault, but where it is found that the accused's conduct went
beyond the scope of the victim's consent, that behaviour which was not
covered by the consent must be punished. In R. v. MacTavish,90 two
schoolboys agreed to a "fair fight". There was no question that the
victim's consent was anything less than informed and voluntary.
However, at the beginning of the fight, the victim fell and the appellant
proceeded to kick him in the face, thereby causing him serious bodily
harm.. The New Brunswick Supreme Court, Appeal Division, held that the
victim had indeed consented to a fair fight; however, kicking has never
been considered as behaviour proper to a "fair fight". Therefore, the
appellant's behaviour exceeded that anticipated by the victim and was
not covered by his consent.9 1 The basic issue seems to be whether or not
the conduct of the recipient of the consent exceeded the limits of such
consent. If this is the case he acted without the victim's consent.
In Regina v. Dix,92 the Ontario Court of Appeal was faced with a
similar fact situation. Here, the two parties were engaged in a "scuffle"
and, by mutual agreement, they left the premises and had a fight outside.
During the fight, the victim was "severely injured", although his injuries
are not specified. Gale C.J.O. said: "We can find no evidence, and have
been referred to none, which would warrant a finding that the actions of
the appellant were outside the scope of the consent which had been
given."9 3 However, he was careful to point out that "the two parties
87. Id. at 507.
88. Supra. n. 72 at 156.
89. Id.
90. (1972), 8 C.C.C. (2d) 306, 20 C.R.N.S. 235, 4 N.B.R. (2d) 876.
91. Supra, n. 90, per Hughes C.J.N.B. at 208 (C.C.C.).
92. (1972), 10 C.CC. (2d) 324 (Ont. C.A.).
93. Id. at 325.
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consented to a fight and the fight was had in a normal manner, if I might
use that phrase. That is not the same situation as in R. v. MacTavish . . .where the combatants expressly, ' 4or impliedly, agreed to a
fair fight and the accused did not fight fairly,"
95
A similar approach was taken in Abraham v. The Queen, where
consent was raised as a defence to a charge of common assault when the
accused kicked his wife in the ribs and pulled her by the hair. The Quebec
Court of Appeal held that the defence of consent is a matter of fact for the
judge to determine, and once it is determined that consent was in fact
obtained, it must be seen whether the accused's actions were covered by
that consent.
In the matter of injuries sustained by players in the course of a
sporting event, the current opinion seems to be that all players accept a
certian degree of risk and potential injury when they agree to participate
in a game such as hockey. 96 However, the issue is one of drawing the line,
so to speak. "[N]o athlete should be presumed to accept vicious,
97
unprovoked or overly violent attack." The approach seems to be similar
to that of Stephen J. in R. v. Coney, where the degree of injury to the
combatants was considered decisive in deciding whether or not consent
was a defence. If the injury sustained is one which could reasonably be
expected to have happened in the regular course of a game, the players
will not be guilty of assault. However, if the injury is not within the scope
it will be
of the normal risks that are assumed to be taken by the players,
98
held to be an assault or an assault causing bodily harm.
Surgical operations can, of course, also constitute the crime and the
tort of assault and battery, if performed without the consent of the
patient. However, this is only a general rule and the exceptions are
several. In Canada, section 45 of the Criminal Code protects most
physicians or surgeons from criminal liability although the section is not
limited to them:
45. Everyone is protected from criminal responsibility for performing a surgical
operation upon any person for the benefit of that person if
(a) the operation is performed with reasonable care and skill, and
(b) it is reasonable to perform the operation, having regard to the state of health of
the person at the time of the operation is performed and to all the circumstances
of the case.

The effect of this section is potentially sweeping, since most operations
are for the benefit of the person being operated upon and it is safe to
assume that such operations are performed with reasonable care and
skill. Furthermore, section 45 is not confined to situations where an
unconscious or disabled person is the subject of the surgical operation and
is unable to give a consent. It applies to both consensual and non
consensual surgery. However, the section may take away the patient's
right to refuse surgical operation although, usually it is available as an
answer to a charge arising out of a surgical operation performed on an
unconscious patient. Thus, theoretically, a Christian Scientist would not
94. Id. at :126.
1(u0t. C.A.).
95. 11974), 26 C.R.N.S. :1.))
916. Se R. v. Maki (1970), C.C.C (2d) :133;R. v.Green (197(0), 2 C.C.C. (2d) 442; R. v. Watson (1975), 26 C.C.C.(2d)
11970)32 Cr. I. (N.S.) 121; flechter. The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports
150. See alwi eomment by l|rent
19 Crii. IL.A,.425.
(1977),
97. Maki. id. per Carter, Prttv. Ct. J.,at (3)1.
9M. Id. Also Watson. supra, n, 96 tit156-8.

99. Medical procedurem are diseuHi, ingreater detail later on in this article.
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be able to charge the operating surgeon with criminal assault after
having his appendix removed without his consent and against his
religious principles. Of course, the surgeon may be civilly liable for
battery. In practice, section 45 is invoked together with the common law
defence of necessity. 10 0
Since the section stipulates that the operation must be for the benefit
of the person, it excludes operations such as those necessary to remove an
organ from a donor of a kidney transplant. It also excludes a whole host
of other operations, such as rhinoplasties (commonly called nose jobs),
breast reduction or augmentation, sex change operations, and,
presumably, sterilization unless the latter is performed for health reasons.
The consent of the patient becomes necessary to free the surgeon from
criminal responsibility. However, it must first be determined whether the
operation, which by necessity inflicts a certain amount of bodily harm
upon the patient, is an activity which can be legally consented to. If the
approach of Stephen J. in Coney is followed, it seems obvious that most of
these operations can be legally consented to. While cosmetic surgery may
not have a significant social value attached to it, it is difficult to see how
it could be injurious to the public. As for organ donation, the motive of the
donors is highly laudable.
Sterilization raises some difficult problems. The most famous comments on the subject were made by Lord Denning in the case of Bravery
v. Bravery.'1 1 Lord Denning's seemingly unsolicited remarks were clearly
obiter and the rest of the court took care to disjoin themselves from them.
Lord Denning referred to Stephen J.'s judgment in Regina v. Coney and
took the view that consent was no defence to sterilization since the
operation, unless undergone for health reasons, was clearly injurious to
10 2
the public:
When it [sterilization] is done with the man's consent for a just cause, it is quite lawful;
as, for instance, when it is done to prevent the transmission of an hereditary disease.
But when it is done without just cause or excuse, it is unlawful, even though the man
consents to it. Take a case where the sterilization operation is done so as to enable a
man to have the pleasure of sexual intercourse, without shouldering the responsibilities
attaching to it. The operation then is plainly injurious to the public interest. It is
degrading to the man himself. It is injurious to his wife and to any woman whom he
may marry, to say nothing of the way it opens to licentiousness; and, unlike
corLtraceptives, it allows no room for a change of mind on either side. It is illegal, even
though the man consents to it.

This is the only judical pronouncement on the issue of sterilization.
However, this view seems not to have been followed over the years, as can
be witnessed by the large number of vasectomies and tubal ligations
which take place everyday, and which do not result in criminal
prosecutions.
Abortion, or procuring a miscarriage under section 251(1) of the
100. See Morgentalerv. The Queen (1975). 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449. 53 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.). The defence of necessity
has been preserved as a common law defence under s. 7(3) of the Criminal Code. It has never been raised
successfully in a criminal case in Canada. "If it does exist it can go no further than to justify non-compliance
in urgent situations of clear and imminent peril when compliance with the law is demonstrably impossible.
No system of positive law can recognize any principle which would entitle a person to violate the law because
on his view the law conflicted with some higher social value." Per Dickson J. at 497 (C.C.C.). See in general
Skegg, A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent (1974), 90 L.Q. Rev. 512. Note
that necessity was held proper as a successful defence in the second Morgentaler appeal to the Quebec
Court of Appeal, and succeeded in his third trial, the re-trial of the first. See Leigh, Necessity and the
Case of Dr. Morgentaler, [19781 Cr. L. Rev. 151; Dickens, The Morgentaler Case: Criminal Process and
Abortion Law (1976), 14 Osgoode Hall L.J. 229 at 266 et seq. What if a patient with a communicable
disease refuses treatment and leaves hospital? Could such a patient be incarcerated and forced to accept
therapy without consent on the ground that he is a risk to the public and to himself?
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is not covered by section 45, as was held in Morgentalerv.
Criminal Code,
10 3
The Queen.
One may well ask with Glanville Williams, "what public interest is to
be served by using the criminal law to prevent adults inflicting discomfort
on each other, or submitting to any form of surgical operation, if they so
wish?" 1 4 Professor Williams himself believes the answer is "none", with
the stipulation that if there is a danger of injury to the public, the law has
10 5
a right to step in and impose its limitations on the parties involved.
Thus, we encourage individual freedom with the condition that it does not
infringe the rights and freedom of others.
Strauss 0 6 suggests that the best standard to be applied is that of
analyzing the behaviour in question and deciding whether or not it is
contra bonos mores. The factors to be considered would be the motives of
of the injured party. Society itself must be
the perpetrator as well as0 those
7
taken into consideration:'
In a society where the freedom of the individual is esteemed highly, he will be accorded a
greater measure of autonomy in waiving his interests. The nature and seriousness of the
injury and the nature of the object attacked must play an important role. The more
valuable the object attacked-e.g. life, liberty, bodily integrity-the more likely it is that
the aggression will be deemed in conflict with good morals.

By making sure that only activities which are not injurious to the
public interest will be allowed, and by ascertaining that only those
capable of understanding are permitted to consent, the criminal law
fulfils its original function of protecting the interests of society in general.
(iii) Private Law
Fleming states:10 8
Voluntary assumption of risk as a defence to negligence corresponds to the plea of
consent in actions for intended harm. Both are expressions of the same philosophy of
individualism, that no wrong is done to one who consents: volenti non fit injuria. The
basic idea is that the plaintiff, by agreeing to assume the risk himself, absolves109the
defendant from all responsibility for it. The latter's duty of care is thus suspended.

The maxim volenti non fit injuria has been applied by the courts in
the common law provinces when no public interest was involved. Consent negates the wrongful element of the defendant's act in intentionally
or unintentionally invading the plaintiffs interest. It amounts to an implied waiver of responsibility. This means, for instance, that at common
law, a physician would not be liable in an action for the tort of assault
and battery or trespass to the person when he did something to a patient
for which he had obtained an informed consent. Such consent where it
exists also bars an action based on the tort of negligence.
For instance, in Kelly v. Hazlett, Morden J. stated:110
Broadly speaking, a battery is the intentional, unconsented to, touching of the person of
the plaintiff by the defendant, while negligence (in the context of a case such as this)
[01.119541 1 W.L.R. 1169,1195413 Al E.R. 59 (C.A.).
102.Supra, n. 101 at 118).
10:1. Supra, n. 1).
104. Williams, supra, n. 72 at 159.

105.Id.
106.1kidiy Injury and fhe lefence of Consent (M.14),81South African I..J. 179 at 183.
107.Id. at 183I-84.
108. Ia, of Torts (4th ed., 1974), 239. See also p. 77.
1(.

Assumption of risk must be distinguished from tontributory negligence although it has been suggested that
consent may amount to contributory negligence.

I M. Supra, n. 23 at 310 (OR.), 555-6 (l).L.R.).
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consists of the substandard execution of a duty of care by the doctor resulting in
damage. The doctor's general duty of care includes not only the duty to exercise due skill
and competence in diagnosis and treatment but also to give reasonable information and
ad-vice to the patient. This latter duty is. one of variable content depending on the
cir.-umstances of the case and the determination of its proper scope is very often a
matter of considerable difficulty.
The issue of "informed" consent can arise in both battery and negligence cases: with
respect to the former a lack of proper information communicated by the doctor to the
palient can vitiate an apparent consent while, with respect to the latter, failure to see to
it that the patient is properly advised can amount, in certain circumstances, to an act of
negligence ...
How the case is pleaded in many cases is more than a matter of mere academic interest.
It will have important bearing on such matters as the incidence of the onus of proof,
causation, the importance of expert medical evidence, the significance of medical
judgment, proof of damage and most important, of course, the substantive basis upon
which liability may be found ...

To make out a case of battery, the plaintiff need only prove that what
was done differed substantially from that to which he assented. As
Haines J. pointed out in Reibl v. Hughes:111
There is no issue for which medical evidence is required. Nor is there a question of
causation: the plaintiff need not show that had the proper information been
communicated consent would have been withheld. The onus to prove consent as a
defence falls upon the defendant doctor. Recast in terms of the obligation on the
defendant, the law of battery in effect places on a physician a strict duty to explain to
his patient, in language which the patient can understand, the essential nature and
quality of the treatment he is to undergo.

His Lordship also said that while the principle can be stated with
relative simplicity, it is difficult to apply it to particular cases. To
112
overcome this difficulty:
it is reasonable to look at the matter of informed consent, as far as an alleged
battery is concerned, from the point of view of what information was communicated. If
the basic nature and character of the operation performed is substantially that of which
the plaintiff was advised, and then agreed to, then there has not been an unconsented to
invasion of the person of the plaintiff, regardless of any failure to disclose any collateral
risks flowing from the operation. However, such failure, if it can be shown to have
resulted in damage to the patient, and was not justified by reasonable medical
considerations, may properly be subject-matter for a claim based on negligence. This
approach . . .seems to me to strike a reasonable balance in the complex of interests,
rights and duties subsisting in the patient-doctor relationship, as well as being
consistent with basic concepts of the law of torts.

Stxictly speaking, the battery approach should be confined to cases
where the physician intentionally deviated from practice not intended to
be beneficial to the patient. Yet, an inadequate explanation of the effects
and risks of an operation could result in an apparent consent being
ineffective and hence not a defence to a claim for assault and battery.
With respect to a claim of negligence:" 13
.. .the issue of informed consent to treatment is a concomitant of the physician's duty
of care. A surgeon's duty to exercise due skill and care in giving his patient reasorhable
information and advice with respect to the risks specifically attendant on a proposed
operative procedure arises out of the special relationship between them. It is a particular
case of the duty which is cast on professional persons in a fiduciary position called upon
specifically or by implication to give information or advice to a client intending and
ent.tled to rely on his statements to determine his course: Nocton v. Lord Ashburton,
11.Supra, n.27 at 311(O.R.).
112.
Per Morden J.in Kelly v.Hazlett, supra, n.27 at558 (D.L.R.). In Canada the great majority of cases involving
the issueof consent and informed consent have been pleaded and decided as battery cases, but there
have
been exceptions. See Rozovsky, n. 28 at 104 et seq.
113. Reibl v. Hughea, supra. n. 27, per Haines J. at 42-43 (D.L.R.); McLean v. Weir et at., supra. n. 27.

ALBERTA LAW REVIEW
ALBERTA LAW REVIEW

IVOL.
XVI
IVOL. XVI

t 19141 A.C. 932; Kenny v. Lockwood, 119321 O.R. 141. That duty does not require warning
the patient of the dangers incident to or possible in any surgical procedure, such as the
dangers of anaesthesia or the risk of infection, matters which men of ordinary
knowledge are presumed to appreciate. It relates to the specific risks within the
surgeon's knowledge peculiar to the contemplated treatment. The scope of this

professional duty of care is defined by the evaluation of a variety of interrelated factors
which bear uniquely on each case, factors such as the presence of an emergency
requiring immediate treatment; the patient's emotional and intellectual make-up, and
his ability to appreciate and cope with the relevant facts; the gravity of the known risks
both in terms of their likelihood and the severity of this realization. The difficulty
evident for the independent evaluation of these factors by a lay tribunal has caused the
law of this jurisdiction to leave the definition of the scope of this duty in any particular
case a matter essentially of medical judgment, one to be determined by the court on the
basis of expert medical evidence.

In Quebec, the relationship between physician and patient is
contractual." 4 Failure to disclose and to obtain consent may amount to a
breach of the physician's contractual obligation. However, it has been
argued that when no consent is given or when consent has been exceeded,
the physician's liability is delictual. 115 In both the civil law and the
common law, it may be against public policy for one person to exempt the
other from responsibility for an intentional fault or for what would
otherwise be a breach of a duty owed to him.
(a) Private Law-CriminalLaw Dichotomy
Since consent is part of the general theory of law, its effects should be
the same in all branches of the law. If consent is effective to make licit a
civil wrong, it should be equally effective in the criminal field, and vice
versa. An act forbidden by the criminal and the private law which
becomes lawful with respect to its civil effects as a result of consent,
should also become licit with respect to its criminal law effects. There is
need for a unified doctrine not only as to the effects of consent but also
with respect to the nature and elements of consent.
(iv) Effect of a Consent that is Null and Void
A consent that is null and void does not eliminate the objective
element of an offence. It may, however, have an effect on the subjective
element of the offence, on the right to prosecute or to bring a civil action
for damages, or on the penalty to be imposed. This may be the situation
when, as a result of an error as to facts, the offender believes that consent
exists, or that it is valid, or that the consenting party has the power to
consent. For instance, in the case of the crime of rape, which consists in
having sexual intercourse with a woman with intent to do so without her
consent or with indifference as to whether or not she consented, it cannot
be committed if that essential mens rea is absent. Thus, if an elleged
offender in fact believed that the woman had consented, whether or not
the belief was based on reasonable grounds he could not be found guilty
of rape.11 6 The offender may also believe that consent was given to him,
or that it pertains to a certain act while it pertains to another act. Lastly,
he may not know that consent has been revoked.
Errors as to the law are also possible. In such a case the error may
relate to the question whether the right belonging to the victim may be
waived. The offender may believe that consent is valid because he ignores
114. X. v. Mellen, 119571 B.R. 389.

115. Beousoleil v. La CwintnnautS des Sreurs de la CharitO de la Prouidence. [19651 B.R. 37. .ee Baudouin, La
responsabilitd civile d~'ictueUe (1973), no. 224, and Crlpeau, La responsabilit civile du medecin el de
1'e'tahlissementhospitalier (1956).
116. See Director of Public Prtsecution v. Morgan, (197512 All E.R. 347 (H.L.).

19781

INFORMED CONSENT

that a juridical act without a lawful cause or consideration or object is
null and void. Finally, he may think that a minor is capable of
consenting.
II. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
TO THE MEDICAL FIELD
(A) The Right to Life
(ia General
The right to life is an individual right protected by the penal and the
private law. 1 7 The victim's consent is no defence" 8 as the State has an
immediate and direct interest in the protection of this right even though
suic:ide is not prohibited or punishable.
It may seem inconsistent for the State to allow self-destruction and to
forbid such destruction of life by another. The reason why suicide is not
punished is that the act is committed by a person who is both the offender
and the victim. On the other hand, counselling or aiding a person to
commit suicide is punishable irrespective of the social or anti-social
motives of the accused. This ties in with section 14 of the Criminal Code.
If the State punishes the person who counsels or aids a person to
commit suicide either by considering the act as an offence sui generis
which is the case in Canada," 9 or an omission to help a person in danger,
it must a fortiori punish a person who kills a consenting victim. 20
The State has a direct interest in the lives of its citizens. In the world
today, no legislation permits the killing of persons upon their consent
although the law of some countries provides for a lesser penalty if certain
conditions are met. Where no special provision exists dealing with the
effect of consent, the act may be culpable homicide, or it may not be
incrminated depending upon the motives of the offender. As noted above,
in Canada, consent as such cannot justify the taking of life. The right to
life is not a right that can be waived or infringed.
(d) Suicide
As an introduction to the subject of homicide on request or with the
con~ent of the victim, it is advisable to further consider suicide as it raises
the basic question whether a person has the right to die. The difficulty
involved in answering this question is that suicide is a licit act whereas
by virtue of section 14 of the Criminal Code the victim cannot render licit
a culpable homicide committed by another person.
The laws of the world are not uniform on this question. Most of them
do not punish suicide, although some of them punish an attempted suicide
or counselling or aiding suicide.
In the case of suicide a person cannot make an agreement with
himself. He cannot be the offender and the victim, a subject and an object
of the law. He cannot have a right to life and be under an obligation to
enfo:rce this right. In other words, an individual does not have legal
obligations towards himself. If suicide is not an offence, then those who
help a person to commit suicide should not be considered his accomplices
since this would suppose a principal offence which does not exist. Thus, a
117.
118.
119.
120.

Criminal
Criminal
Criminal
Criminal

Code,
Code,
Code,
Code,

ea. 196-243. Note that the expresaion "right to life" is not used in any political sense.
a. 14.
s. 224.
s. 14.
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physician who gives his patient the means of killing himself should not
be criminally responsible. However, the Criminal Code avoids12 1the
difficulty by making the accomplice guilty of an offence sui generis.
If the criminal law does not punish suicide because the victim is both a
passive and an active subject of the act, the situation is not the same with
respect to the person assisting another to commit suicide. In this case the
victim is the person who committed suicide and the offender of this sui
generis offence becomes the principal actor. Thus, it is logical to have a
special offence in the Code, although the motives for counselling and
aiding to commit suicide should be taken into consideration. Proper
motives would justify a physician in certian circumstances, although this
approach may violate the spirit of section 14 of the Criminal Code.
Another view is that motives should not be a complete excuse so as to
render the act licit. They would only diminish the penalty.
Consent should not be a justification in the case of the right to life
which is a right that cannot be waived or infringed. However, the social
or anti-social motives of the agent could be considered as an extenuating
or aggravating circumstance.
(iii) Homicide on Request or with the Consent of the Victim
In the case of homicide on request or with the consent of the victim,
the offender's participation is not limited to advice or active or passive
assistance and co-operation. The offender is the one who kills the victim
as in the case of mercy killing by a physician.
Homicide on request or with the consent of the victim is not recognized
is culpable homicide. Consent does not make the act
in Canada. The act
122
licit or justifiable.
It could be argued that the killing of a person at his request or with his
consent should be excusable or licit if the motives of the person doing the
killing are not anti-social. Why should there be a difference between
homicide on request or with consent and suicide? It is the wishes or
intention of the victim that count, not the material act of giving death.
Furthermore, in such cases there is no intention to cause harm, no
criminal intent,, although the intention to kill exists. It is suggested that
there should be a special provision in the Code listing the cases in which
homicide should not be severely punished. Section 14 of the Criminal
Code is too wide in its present form.
Most writers reject the maxim volenti non fit injuria in the case of
homicide on request or with consent because of the general interest of
society and of the State. Of course all the elements of homicide are
present: a material act likely to cause death, a person alive, the intent to
kill, etc. However, motive is not part of the offence, especially since
section 14 rejects consent.
It would seem advisable to make homicide upon request or with
consent a special offence. The method for obtaining consent as well as
motives would be taken into consideration as consent is closely connected
with motives. Also, should it make any difference whether homicide is
committed at the request of the victim or with his consent? Who took the
initiative may be a relevant consideration. Homicide with consent may
have to be more severely punished than homicide on request. Perhaps this
should be left to the judge's or jury's appreciation.
121. Criminal Code.

. 224.

122. Criminal Code, a. 14.
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In certain cases it may be difficult to distinguish between homicide on
request or with consent and aiding suicide. However, the person who aids
is not committing a homicide, but a special offence sui generis.
(iv) Euthanasiaand the Right to Die
This analysis leads us to a consideration of euthanasia and the right
to die, which involves the distinction between terminating life and
abbreviating the process of dying.
(a) Euthanasia
Euthanasia is the deliberate act of commission or omission to end the
life of a person suffering from a painful and terminal illness. It is
voluntary or involuntary depending upon whether or not the patient
consented to, or requested the ending of his life. It is well established in
Canadian criminal law that a positive act of euthanasia constitutes
culpable homicide (murder) and that a person is not legally permitted to
consentb to the infliction of death upon himself by another. 123 Thus, death
given with the consent of the patient or at his request by a positive act is
still culpable homicide (murder)1 24 While judges and juries appear to
show extreme solicitude towards persons accused of positive euthanasia,
the act is clearly illegal in Canada. Actually, euthanasia is a euphemism
for culpable homicide.
(b) Right to Die
Euthanasia by omission has been the object of much discussion as it
involves the patient's right to die. Should a physician be allowed to
withdraw any supportive therapy and let a terminally ill patient die of his
natural death by abstention or omission of care and treatment?
In practice, euthanasia by omission is often administered at the
request, or with the consent of, the terminally ill patient. The issue is
whether the physician-patient relationship imposes upon the physician
the duty to take every step to preserve the patient's life.
It is submitted that a terminally ill patient should have the right to
refuse 'life-prolonging treatment by withholding his consent to the
medical postponement of his death. On the other hand, the law should not
hold the physician accountable for malpractice when he respects and
complies with the patient's decision:125
...Provided that the doctor is satisfied that the patient when forbidding further
treatment was aware of what he was saying, the short answer must be that he is not in
breach of his duty. There is no doubt that his duty extends to informing his patient, if
asked, of the nature of his illness and its likely prognosis. In such a way he puts his
patient in a position to make a decision which is informed. Once the decision is made he
is obliged to respect it. Thus, the doctor on this reasoning incurs no liability under the
civil law, nor can he be accused of any crime. To consider the issue in greater detail, the
only circumstance under which his omission to treat his patient further could render
him guilty of manslaughter is where he has failed to act in a situation where the
criminal law imposes on him a duty to act.

There are many objections to voluntary euthanasia: The criteria of
incurability are often uncertain; to abstain from treating a patient could
be considered against the Code of Ethics of the medical profession or the
123. UriminI Code, s. 14,
124. ';riminal Code, s. 212.
125. Kennedy, The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged Not to Receive Further Treatment
,7rom Doctors. 119761 Cr. . Rev. 217 t 229.
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Hippocratic oath;1 26 euthanasia 27 by omission may also violate the
provisions of the Criminal Code.

In the absence of consent to prolong treatment, a state of necessity
may justify the physician's act done against the will of the terminally ill
patient. 2 1 On the other hand, the act of the physician in withdrawing
29
treatment may contravene his obligation to assist a person in danger, 130
or constitute homicide by omission provided there is a legal duty to act.
The physician may also be liable civilly for malpractice or for
misfeasance on the ground that once a physician undertakes to render
necessary medical services, he remains under a legal duty to perform
them if by omitting to do so the life of the patient would be endangered.
To conclude, today, the legal status of the physician who merely
withholds treatment at the request of a terminally ill patient is in great
dispute. However, in Canada, no physician has ever been indicted or
convicted for such an act. In the case of voluntary euthanasia, whether by
positive act or by omission, the major difficulty is to insure the
voluntariness of the consent by a patient who by definition is a victim of
a terminal illness and is either experiencing considerable pain or is
drugged. Should voluntary euthanasia be legalized, the way to insure that
a person's consent is legally "voluntary" is to require that it be given
while he is rational and sane and well before he is in pain or drugged.
This could take the form of a declaration in a special document as in the
case of a gift of tissue. Before the administration of euthanasia, the
attending physician would make sure that the prior declaration of
consent is still in accord with the ascertained desire of the patient at that
time. Revocation of the declaration would be allowed at any time by a
clear act by the patient, or on his order.
(c) Minors and Mentally Diminished Patients
Where children and mentally ill persons, or patients who are drugged
or crazed by pain are involved, persons legally responsible for them or
should not be allowed to give a valid consent on their
close relatives
13 1
behalf.
In the case of a minor this would not be legally possible, as his parents
or guardian can only consent to treatment not withdrawal of treatment,
since the contemplated act must be in the interest of the child. However,
since in some jurisdictions, the law only creates a duty to provide medical care recommended by a legally qualified medical practitioner, it
could be argued that if, because of an unfavourable prognosis treatment is no longer indicated, parents commit no offence in withdrawing
consent to its use.
Where an adult unable to make a decision is involved, relatives should
have no authority to consent because of the possible harmful results of
such authorization. A conflict of interests is always possible as well as a
iiandian Medical Association would seem to allow euthanasia by
126. In Canada, the Codle of Ethics(if the
imismi.n as it provides that an ethical physician will allow death to occur with dignity and comfort when
deith of the body appears to 1h inevitable, and may support the hody when clinical death of the mind has
iiicurred, hut no'd not prollng life by unusual or heroii means.
127. s. 202 Icriminal negligenccl, 205 Iiornicide), 207 (death which might have been prevented), 209(acceleration
,"t ieathi, 212 (murder), 198 Iduty -if persons undertaking arts dangerous to life), 199 (duty of persons
un.ilrtakiig acts).
128, Also Crimnal Code, s. 45. although this section only deals with surgical operations.
129. This is the vuse in mnlle coiuntries.
1311. Se Criminal Cide, ass tIK-l94.
It3. S'. Symposium.-Mental Inioinpetents and the Right It Die (1977). II Suffolk U.L Rev. 919-973.
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feeling of guilt on the part of the relatives. There is no doubt that in the
case of voluntary euthanasia consent cannot always be satisfactorily
obtained.
(d) Conclusions
Euthanasia should be made a special offence distinct from culpable
homicide or be legalized. In the latter case, legalization should be
restricted to voluntary euthanasia. If made a special offence, the judge
and jury should be able to take motives into consideration. The penalty
should be lighter than in the case of culpable homicide. In other words,
the physician's motives and the patient's consent would be admissible
and mitigate punishment by affecting the sentence to be received upon
convictin. Section 14 of the Criminal Code is much too sweeping in the
complex world in which we live.
Other countries have dealt with homicide on request or with the
consent of the victim. For instance, in Switzerland, homicide on request is
a special offence which is not as serious as culpable homicide. Section 114
of the Swiss Penal Code of 1937 provides that: "he who kills a person
upon his serious and urgent request, is punishable by imprisonment".132
In Italy, the Penal Code of 1930 also considers homicide on request or
with the consent of the victim as a special offence. It does not matter who
initiated the request or sought the consent. 133 In Colombia, euthanasia is
also a special offence witl the difference that consent or request is not
necessary, provided the act was committed out of compassion. Mitigated
charges and punishment, even judicial pardon are justified on the
grounds that the reprehensible nature of the act is reduced by virtue of the
motivating compassion of the actor and the consenting plea of the
patient."3
In California the Natural Death Act 133 recognizes that an adult person
has the right to make a written directive instructing his physician to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal
condition. § 7188 provides as follows:
Any adult person may execute a directive directing the withholding or withdrawal of
life-suiataining procedures in a terminal condition. The directive shall be signed by the
declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related to the declarant by blood or
marriage and who would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant
upon his decease under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto then existing or, at
the time of the directive, by operation of law then existing. In addition, a witness to a
directive shall not be the attending physician, an employee of the attending physician
or a health facility in which the declarant is a patient, or any person who has a claim
againE.t any portion of the estate of the declarant upon his decease at the time of the
execution of the directive ...

The directive to physicians must follow a special form:
Directive made this -day of
(month, year).
I
being of sound mind, willfully, and voluntarily make
known my desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstance1 set forth below, do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certified to
be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application of lifesustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the moment of my
death and where my physician determines that my death is imminent whether or
1:12., ee |estalozzi-Henggeler, Euthanasia Under the Swiss Code (1961). 15 Southwest L.J. 393.
:13. S. 579.
134. Uode of 19:16,a.364. See also Norwegian Criminal Code of 1902, s. 235.
135. Cal. Stats. 1976, c. 1439.
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not life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such procedures be withheld
or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such lifesustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall be honored by my
family and physician(s) as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical
or surgical treatment and accept the consequences from such refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my
physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my
pregnancy.
4. 1 have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as having a terminal
condition by
, M.D., whose address is
I understand that if I have not filled in the physician's name and address, it shall
be presumed that I did not have a terminal condition when I made out this
directive.
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the date filled in above.
6. 1 understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and mentally
competent to make this directive.
Signed
City, County and State of Residence
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him or her to be of
sound mind.
Witness
Witness

In the case of patients confined in skilled nursing facilities who are
insulated from a voluntary decision making role by virtue of the custodial
nature of their care, the Act requires special assurance that they are
capable of wilfully and voluntarily executing a directive. The directive
may be revoked at any time by the declarant, without regard to his
mental state of competency, by a variety of methods including a verbal
declaration. No criminal or civil liability exists on the part of any person
for failure to act upon a revocation made pursuant to the Act unless that
person had actual knowledge of the revocation. If the declarant becomes
comatose or is rendered incapable of communicating with the attending
physician, the directive remains in effect for the duration of the comatose
condition or until such time as the declarant's condition renders him able
to communicate with the attending physician. This is a dangerous
provision as a comatose declarant who has changed his mind with
respect to a directive he had signed some years previously will not be able
to indicate his present intention to revoke the directive. Also a directive
supposed long lost by the patient may suddenly turn up in the physician's
file. Should the physician be under an obligation to ask whether such
directive is still in force?
Sections 7190-7191 provide that:
§7190. Civil liability or guilt of criminal act or unprofessional conduct.
No physician or health facility which, acting in accordance with the requirements of
this chapter, causes the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures
from a qualified patient, shall be subject to civil liability therefrom. No licensed
health professional, acting under the direction of a physician, who participates in
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter shall be subject to any civil liability. No physician, or
licensed health professional acting under the direction of a physician, who
participates in the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of any criminal act or
of unprofessional conduct.
§7191. Effectuation of directive by attending physician.
(a) Prior to effecting a withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from
a qualified patient pursuant to the directive, the attending physician shall
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determine that the directive complies with section 7188, and, if the patient is
mentally competent, that the directive and all steps proposed by the attending
physician to be undertaken are in accord with the desires of the qualified patient.
(b) If the declarant was a qualified patient at least 14 days prior to executing or reexecuting the directive, the directive shall be conclusively presumed, unless revoked,
to be the directions of the patient regarding the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining procedures. No physician, and no licensed health professional acting
under the direction of a physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable for failing to
effectuate the directive of the qualified patient pursuant to this subdivision. A
failure by a physician to effectuate the directive of a qualified patient pursuant to
this division shall constitute unprofessional conduct if the physician refuses to
make the necessary arrangements, or fails to take the necessary steps, to effect the
transfer of the qualified patient to another physician who will effectuate the
directive of the qualified patient.
(c) If the declarant becomes a qualified patient subsequent to executing the directive
and has not subsequently re-executed the directive, the attending physician may
give weight to the directive as evidence of the patient's directions regarding the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures and may consider other
factors, such as information from the affected family or the nature of the patient's
illness, injury, or disease, in determining whether the totality of circumstances
known to the attending physician justify effectuating the directive. No physician,
and no licensed health professional acting under the direction of a physician, shall
be criminally or civilly liable for failing to effectuate the directive of the qualified
patient pursuant to this subdivision.

The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a
patient in accordance with the provisions of the Act does not constitute a
suicide or have any effect on life insurance.
The Act does not impair or supersede any legal right or legal
responsibility which any person may have to effect the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner, nor does
it condone or authorize or approve mercy killing, or permit any
affirmative or deliberate act or
omission to end life other than to permit
36
the natural process of dying.
It seems that under the Act, a physician will often have to seek legal
opinion (for example, whether the directive is valid) before withholding or
withdrawing life-sustaining procedures.
A patient should always be able to consent to ordinary life-sustaining
procedures during a terminal condition in spite of a directive.
To conclude this discussion, it is worth quoting the medical directives
adopted by the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences in November 1976
together with the accompanying commentary as they provide guidelines
that could be adopted in Canada.
II. LE TRAITEMENT MEDICAL
(a) Q,,and le patient a dtk convenablement renseignd et qu'il est capable de
discernement, sa volont6 quant au traitement doit etrA respectee, mime si elle ne
correspond pas aux indications de Ia m&lecine.
(b) Quand le patient est incapable de discernement, que ce soit parce qu'il est
inconscient ou pour une autre cause, les normes de Ia m~decine aideront le m~lecin A
fi:er sa ligne de conduite qui, par ailleurs, se situe dans le cadre de la gestion sans
mandat. Le mdecin doit alors tenir compte de ce que 'on peut prdsumer de Ia
vklontt du patient. Les proches de celui-ci doivent btre entendus, mais juridiquement
la d~cision dernire appartient au m~decin. Si le patient est mineur ou interdit, les
miaesures mtdicales ne doivent pas 4tre r6duites ou suspendues t l'encontre de Ia
volonth des parents ou du tuteur.
136. In Ontario see Bill 3 (private member's Bill), 4th Session, 30th Legis.1977, entitled, "An Act Respecting the
Withholding or Withdrawal of Treatment where Death is Inevitable", which was patterned after the
California legislation. The Bill, which died on the order paper, was not reintroduced after the election.
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(c) S'il existe des possibilitds d'am61ioration chez un malade ou chez un bless6 en danger
de mort, le m~decin prend les mesures propres A le guerir et A le soulager.
(d) Chez lee mourants et chez lee malades et lee blessds en danger de mort-dont
l'affection 6volue de fagon irreversible vers une issue fatale, et-qui ne pourraient
ultgrieurement avoir une vie relationnelle consciente, le mfdecin se contente de
calmer lee souffrances, mais il n'est pas obligd d'utiliser toutes lee ressources
thdrapeutiques qui pourraient prolonger la vie.
(1) Le m6decin est lid par la volontd d'un patient capable de discernement, lorsque celuici a 6W informd de sa maladie, de son traitement et des risques qu'il comporte. Le
patient capable de discernement decide s'il veut tre traitk ou non; il eat en droit par
consequent de faire interrompre la traitement. Cela dtant, la base juridique pour
appliquer des mesures thdrapeutiques que le patient ne desire plus fait ddfaut. Dans
ce cas, et conformement au ddsir du patient, le m6decin doit se contenter
d'administrer des analgdsiques ou de procdder A quelque traitement limit6, sans qu'il
puisse tre rendu responsable juridequement. Fait rggle le principe: 'Voluntas
aegroti suprema lex esto'.
(2) Si le malade condamn6 n'est plus capable de discernement et ne peut donc plus
exprimer sa volont6 (ainsi par exemple le patient inconscient), le devoir du m~decin
eat determind sur le plan du droit civil par lee r~gles de la 'gestion d'affaires' (C.O.
art 419 sq.). La volont6 prdsum~e du patient doit dicter les mesures th~rapeutiques.
Cette volont6 ne doit pas tre interpretde sans autre dans le sens d'une prolongation
des souffrances. L'application des mesures medicales peut au contraire ne plus etre
indiqude, en raison du respect du A la personnalit6 du mourant. Si cette condition est
remplie, le medecin peut se justifier sur le plan pdnal en invoquant un motif
correspondant A la gestion sans mandat ou 'gestion d'affaires'.
(3) Une d6claration 6crite ant~rieure du patient, par laquelle il renonce A toute
prolongation artificielle de sa vie, peut 6tre un indice important pour 6tablir quelle
eat sa volont4. Mais ce qui compte, c'est la volont6 prsumde actuelle, laquelle ne peut
atre 6tablie que par une appreciation soigneuse de toutes lee circonstances. Du fait
d6jA qu'elle peut tre retir~e en tout temps, la dfclaration ant6rieure ne lie pas le
medecin. On doit donc toujours se demander si le patient, it l'instant consider6,
rvoquerait ou non sa decision.
(4) Les proches du patient doivent Atre entendus. (En rfgle g~n6rale, lea proches sont lea
parents les plus rapproch6s du patient; d'autres personnes peuvent eventuellement
etre considdr6es comme des proches). Mais Ia d~cision derniAre, juridiquement,
appartient au med~cin. Quand le patient est mineur ou interdit, le traitement ne doit
btre ni rfduit ni suspendu A l'encontre de la volont6 des parents ou du tuteur.

(v) Abortion
Abortion also involves the right to life. Subsections (1) and (2) of
section 251 of the Criminal Code punish abortion unless performed in
accordance with subsections (3) to (6). In cases where abortion is licit, the
pregnant woman's consent is still necessary unless it is an emergency
situation. 37 Consent to an abortion outside these sections is null and of
no effect as its object is illicit and therefore against public policy. A
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada has also held that section 45 of
the Criminal Code is not available as a defence to a charge under
subsections (1) and (2) of section 251.138 This view is questionable as there
might be some genuine cases where an abortion should take place and
there is not enough time to follow the procedures provided by subsections
(3) to (6) of section 251.'19 Still section 45 may be inadequate since it
protects only a person performing a surgical operation, not a woman
from her liability under subsection 2 of section 251.
Since abortion may endanger the woman's life and destroys the
unborn child, her consent alone cannot render lawful that which
constitutes a danger to life. Subsections (1) and (2) of section 251 protect
137. S. 2517).
1:18.MorjlentaLer v. The Queen, supra. n. 100. The cage also deals with the defence of necessity apart from s. 45.
139. Id., per Laskin C.J.C., dissenting, at 474-476 (C.C.C.).
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not only the woman's right to life but also the fetus and society in general. 139' This is why consent cannot render licit an act that is likely to
destroy the right of a passive subject, namely the fetus. It is only where
abortion is permitted by the Criminal Code that the woman's consent is a
valid defence to a charge of assault against the physician.
When abortion is prohibited, the same penalty is applicable whether or
not the pregnant woman gives her consent.
It is interesting to note that contrary to the situation in the case of
suicide.. self abortion is also punishable.140 The reason for this rule is that
there are two potential victims involved, the pregnant woman and the
unborn child.
In some countries, when the woman did not consent to the abortion,
the physician is punished more severely. The consent given by the woman
may also be punishable as such. In Canada, this seems to be implied by
the wording of subsection (2) of section 251 which uses the words "permits
any means to be used . . ..
(vi) Research Involving Pregnant Women, Fetuses
and in vitro Fertilization
Research, development or demonstration activity should not be
conducted on a nonviable fetus ex utero if it were of itself to terminate
heart beat and respiration. If such experiments were to be allowed in
other situations, they should be consented to by the pregnant woman with
the participation of a protection committee. 14'
At the present time, the law generally does not distinguish between
viability and nonviability after birth. Full protection as a person is given,
notwithstanding that immaturity may preclude the nonviable fetus from
having an independent existence. However, legal distinctions might be
42
made on that basis.1
With respect to consent, the same rules should apply for therapeutic
research on the viable fetus as for such research on an infant. For
nontherapeutic research on the nonviable fetus, judicial review might be
appropriate. Where a premature infant who has the capacity to sustain
heart beat and respiration is involved, the rules applicable to research on
143
children are relevant.
In the case of research involving pregnant women or fetuses in utero
the rules relating to abortion may be applicable if as a result of the
procedures, a miscarriage takes place. Otherwise, assurances should be
obtained that such research will not likely harm the fetus. The consent of
both prospective legal parents should also be obtained when reasonably
possible especially where a viable fetus is involved. However, since a
mother may seek an abortion of a viable fetus because it endangers her
health, it may be improper to obtain her consent. In such a case it might
be advisable to appoint a guardian for the viable fetus prior to the

139a. Compare Weiler, Caton,. The Inhorn Child in Canadian Lau,(1976), 14 Osgoode Hall L.J. 643 at 647.
140. Crimiil Code, s.251(2).
141. In U.S. see Department of.Health, Education, and Welfare, Protection of Human Subjects, Policies and
Procedures, Federal Register, Vol. 40, No 154, Aug. 8, 1975, p. 13526; 45 F.R.C., § 46, 201-211. See Reback,
Fetal Experimentatiun: Moral, Legal and Medical Implications (1974), 28 Stanford L. Rev. 1191; Martin,
EthicalStandards for Fetal Experimentation (1974-75), 43 Fordham L. Rev. 547; and Roe v. Wade (1973), 410
U.S. 11:1,93 SCt.7)5.

142. See Criminal Code, s.206.
14:t. See infra.
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abortion so as not to inhibit procedures designed to save the fetus' life. 44
Questions may be raised regarding the ethical validity of consent by a
pregnant woman on behalf of a fetus for its inclusion in a research
activity of no benefit to that fetus, especially if the woman has already
decided to terminate her pregnancy.
Where research involves in vitro fertilization it should be approved by
an ethical advisory board.
In conclusion, it is of interest to quote the Regulations adopted by the
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare: 1 45
Activities directed toward pregnant women as subjects.
(a) No pregnant women may be involved as a subject in an activity covered by this
subpart unless: (1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the
mother and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent necessary to
meet such needs, or (2) the risk to the fetus is minimal.
(b) An activity permitted under paragraph (a) of this section may be conducted only if
the mother and father are legally competent and have given their informed consent
after having been fully informed regarding possible impact on the fetus, except that
the father's informed consent need not be secured if: (1) The purpose of the activity is
to meet the health needs of the mother; (2) his identity or whereabouts cannot
reasonably be ascertained; (3) he is not reasonably available; or (4) the pregnancy
resulted from rape.
Activities directed toward fetuses in utero as subjects.
(a) No fetus in utero may be involved as a subject in any activity covered by this
subpart unless: (1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the
particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent
necessary to meet such needs, or (2) the risk to the fetus imposed by the research is
minimal and the purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical
knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.
(b) An activity permitted under paragraph (a) of this section may be conducted only if
the mother and father are legally competent and have given their informed consent,
except that the father's consent need not be secured if: (1) His identity or
whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he is not reasonably available, (3)
the pregnancy resulted from rape.
Activities directed toward fetuses ex utero, including nonviable fetuses, as subjects.
(a) No fetus ex utero may be involved as a subject in an activity covered by this subpart
until it has been ascertained whether the particular fetus is viable, unless: (1) There
will be no added risk to the fetus resulting from the activity, and (2) the purpose of
the activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be
obtained by other means.
(b) No nonviable fetus may be involved as a subject in an activity covered by this
subpart unless:. (1) Vital functions of the fetus will not be artificially maintained
except where the purpose of the activity is to develop new methods for enabling
fetuses to survive to the point of viability, (2) experimental activities which of
themselves would terminate the heart beat or respiration of the fetus will not be
employed, and (3) the purpose of the activity is the development of important
biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.
(c) In the event the fetus ex utero is found to be viable, it may be included as a subject in
the activity only to the extent permitted by and in accordance with the requirements
of other subparts of this part.
(d) An activity permitted under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section may be conducted
only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given their informed
consent, except that the father's infornmed consent need not be secured if: (1) his
identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably he ascertained, (2) he is not reasonably
available, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from rape.

144. Note that in some countries interests of the fetus in utero are protected by both the criminal law and the civil
low. In the U.S.A. many states have statutes dealing with fetal experimentation. For a survey see Reback,
supra, n. 141.
145. See supra, n. 131, §§ 46.207 to 209.
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(B) The Right to Physical and Mental Integrity
1. Introduction
In our Western society, it is well established that each individual has
the right to the integrity of his body and mind which must not be injured
by others. This is a fundamental right that has been enforced by the
courts. However, why should an individual not be able to validly dispose
of this right by consenting to be injured as long as no harm is done to
others? In other words, may the right to physical and mental integrity be
legally infringed? As noted previously, self-inflicted injury is generally
not pumished by the penal law since the offender and the victim are the
same person. Why should the solution be different when the injury is
inflicted by another but with the victim's consent?
In general, it has been recognized that an individual is free to do as he
pleases with his body and no offence is committed when he requests
another to infringe his right to physical and mental integrity. However,
when the social order is disturbed by such infringement, a criminal
offence may be committed. It all depends upon whether or not the State
has an immediate and direct interest in the preservation of the physical
or mental integrity of such individual. Are there any limitations imposed
upon the power to waive the right to physical and mental integrity?
As noted previously, the basic Canadian legislative texts 146 deal with
voluntary harm. 'Yet, even in the case of voluntary harm liability may
still exist.
Men living in society have certain social obligations. To consent to
being injured may harm society. Although, today, an individual is given
great freedom with respect to his body, there should be some limits
imposed upon this freedom. The State must protect the physical and
mental integrity of people who are a source of wealth, for instance for
economic reasons, for defence purposes and so on. Where the State has a
direct and immediate interest in the physical and mental integrity of the
victim, consent should be irrelevant.
In principle, the right to physical and mental integrity should not be
capable of being waived. However, there must, of necessity, be some
exceptions to this principle especially in the medical field and with
respect to sports.1 4 7 In Canada and in England, it has been stated and restated over and over that everyone has a right to consent to the infliction
upon himself of bodily harm not amounting to maim. Thus, the Canadian
Criminal Code recognizes the validity of consent in the case of assault. 48
The co:rrect approach would seem to be that consent is effective provided
the injury is not too serious. Consent to be effective must not be against
public policy. If the risk of injury is too serious, consent if given is against
public policy and of no effect.
The piercing of ears, tattooing, circumcision, blood transfusion,
defloration of virginity, removal of skin, cutting of hair, nails, beard,
esthetic surgery, and some medical experiments are certainly not against
public policy. Only where the resulting injury could be very serious would
consent to such injury be against public policy. When the Criminal Code
mentions consent, it must mean consent that is not against public policy,
whose effect is not illicit.
14f.

Criminal Co~de,si. 244-246.

147. Fr a good example see Indian Penal Cotle, s. 87.
141.
Criminal Code, s. 244.
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In the case of a criminal offence due to the negligence of the actor,
consent should also be a good defence but not on the private law side if
it amounts to malpractice.' 4
When treating or operating upon a patient a physician or surgeon
infringes the patient's physical or mental integrity. Thus, a charge of
assault is always possible. However, consent or the doctrine of
emergency-necessity prevents the act from being a criminal assault or
civil battery.lsu Should the rules be different where the act of the
physician or surgeon is not done for therapeutic reasons but for esthetic
or experimental purposes? Furthermore, in the case of castration,
sterilization or change of sex, is the act against public policy so that
consent to it becomes illicit?"" These are some of the questions that will
be analyzed in the following sections.
2. Therapeutic Treatment
The criminal law seems quite clear in the case of therapeutic treatment
which is for the benefit of the patient. Such treatment does not constitute
an assault if consent to it has been validly given.' 52 The act of the
surgeon or physician is justified and licit as public policy is not against
therapeutic treatment. In fact, the State has a direct interest in having its
citizens properly treated and restored to good health. Furthermore, when
the patient asks the physician to treat him, he is deemed to accept all the
consequences that may result from such treatment.
It could also be argued that admission to the practice of medicine
which is sanctioned by the law gives immunity to the physician. The
physician must act for therapeutic reasons, he must also be a physician
and licenced to practice in the province where the treatment takes place.
Consent given to a layman would not be effective as only physicians are
allowed to treat patients.' 53
If consent is given to a therapeutic treatment, the physician cannot
experiment with the patient since by doing so he would exceed the
consent that has been given to him. The therapeutic aspect of the
treatment or operation is the consideration for consent. This consideration is illicit if the physician's act is not therapeutic.
The physician must also act in conformity with sound medical practice
without imprudence or negligence. As noted previously, the consent must
be "informed" as 5the patient must be made aware of the treatment and of
its consequences.1 1
When the patient consents to an operation, it does not automatically
imply that the surgeon is authorized to perform further surgical
procedures if needed as a result of what he discovers during the operation.
Immunity from prosecution exists if the best interests of his patient's
health and possibly life required him to perform further surgical
procedures. 155 If the "informed" consent included the possibility of such
procedures, the surgeon should be protected. The justification for the
physician's immunity from the criminal law is consent validly given. If
149. Id., H. 202. As noted previously consent is not the equivalent of an exculpatory clause.
150. Id., s. 224, 199, 45.
151. Ne Iravery v. Blravery, 119541 : All E.R. 59. per Ienning I..J. (CA.).
152. Criminal Code, N. 244.
1,53. S.e, however, id.. s. 45.
supra.
155, Comlare MaIrshall v. (arry. 1193:I1 3 ID.,.R. 20(,
1M.e.'

I).L.R. 442,11949] 1 W.W.l{. 989 (B.C.S.C.).

u C. CC. I

(N.S.S.C.) t.. Murray v. McMurchy, 1194912
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the patient cannot consent his legal representatives will do so for him.
This raises the question whether minors or other legally incompetent
persons should be consulted and their consent obtained sometimes in
additiDn to or without that of their legal representatives.
(a) Minors, Mental Patients
Normally, parental consent is required by law for the performance of
non-emergency medical procedures on minors. However, today, the courts
of some provinces and in most of the United States have held that a
minor approaching the age of majority may give his own consent if he
has the intellectual capacity to fully appreciate the nature and consequences of a medical procedure performed for his benefit.156 This is called
the "mature minor" exception. For the purposes of consent to medical
treatmnent, the age of consent and the age of majority are not necessarily
the same. The test is whether the patient is old enough to be able to
appreciate the nature of the treatment and come to a reasonable
decision.)57
American legislatures have also adopted laws which permit any unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate
the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or
procedures, to consent to beneficial therapeutic medical procedures. 15
Since the test adopted depends upon the maturity of the individual minor
patient, the range for effective consent may vary between the ages of
fourteen and eighteen, although if one were to follow section 13 of the
Criminal Code by analogy, the minimum age could be lowered to seven.
In England section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969159 provides
that:
8(1) The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to
med.cal or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would any surgical,
trespass to his person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of constitute a
full age; and
where a minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any
treatment
it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or guardian.
(2) In this section "surgical, medical or dental treatment" includes any
undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis, and this section applies to any procedure
procedure
(including, in particular, the administration of an anaesthetic) which is ancillary
to any
treatment as it applies to that treatment.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective any consent
which
would have been effective if this section had not been enacted.

The capacity of a child over sixteen years depends entirely upon his
ability to understand the nature and effects of the procedures undertaken.
Section 8(3) is a statutory recognition that at common law it may be
possible for a minor under sixteen to validly consent and expressly
reserves that right for the underage minor.
156 Nathmn, Medical Negligence 176 (1957); Johnston v. Wellesley
Hospital, supra, n. 38.
157. Sharpe, The Minor Transplant Donor (1975), 7 Ottawa .. Rev.
85; Skegg, Consent to Medical Procedures on
Minors (197:3),
36 Mod. L.

Rev. 370. Not discussed here are: the emergency exception, since it is of a general
nature, i.e., no consent is required in the case of an emergency; or the emancipated
emancipated minor is one who is treated as an adult by reason of an agreement minor exception, i.e., an
with or conduct by the
parents that establishes the minor's independence from them. Such minor may
or the best interests of the child exception which involves a conflict betweenconsent to medical treatment;
the
right of the parents to
withhold consent and the power of the State to order the medical treatment
as parens patriae.
158. E.g., Miss. Code Ann. §§ 7121.7181 (1966); Pilpel, Minor's Rights to Medical
Care(1972) 35 Albany L. Rev. 462.
In general see Wilkins, Children's Rights: Removing the Parental Consent
Barrier to Medical Treatment of
Minors. 11975] Ariz. St. L.J. 31; Tompkins,

Health Care for Minors: The Right to Consent (1974-76)..0 Sask. L.
Rev. 41; Crtpeau, Le consentement du mineur en matiere de soins
et traitements niedicaux ou ehiruricaux
selon le droit civil canadien (1974), 52 Can. Bar Rev. 247; Mayrand,
supra. n. 23 at 52 et seq.: Wadlington,
Minrs and Health Care: The Age of Consent (1973), 11 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 115.

159. C. 46.
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In Ontario a Regulation passed'60 pursuant to the Public Hospitals

Act'" 1 permits a person sixteen years of age or older to give a valid

consent to a surgical operation, diagnostic test or a form of medical

treatment without parental consent or determination of his capacity to
fully appreciate the nature or consequences of the proposed form of

treatment, so long as the physician sees him in certain public hospitals
and that is the place where the treatment is administered. The regulation

also limits the operations of the emergency exception to life-threatening
Quebec article 36 of the Public Health Protection Act
situations. 6 ' In
63
provides that:1
An establishment or a physician may provide the care and treatment required by the
state of health of a minor fourteen years of age or older with his consent without being
required to obtain the consent of the person having paternal authority; the establish.
ment or the physician must however inform the person having paternal authority in the
case where the minor is sheltered for more than twelve hours, or of extended treatment.
Where a minor is under fourteen years of age, the consent of the person having paternal
authority must be obtained; however, if that consent cannot be obtained or where
refusal by the person having paternal authority is not justified in the child's best
interest, a judge of the Supreme Court may authorize the care or treatment.

In the case of a minor under the age of fourteen his parents can not
force upon him a treatment that is not for his benefit. Furthermore, if the
parents refuse treatment, it can be authorized by the courts.

is in danger parental consent or court
When the life of the minor
164
authorization is not required:
An establishment or a physician shall see that care or treatment is provided to every
person in danger of death; if the person is a minor, the consent of the person having
paternal authority shall not be required.

As far as the criminal law is concerned in the absence of statutory

provisions to the contrary, there is no reason to believe that minors are in
a position different from that of adults with respect to consent to medical
treatment of a therapeutic nature.
To conclude, it would seem reasonable to maintain that consent to
medical therapeutic treatment should be entirely dependent upon the
patient's capacity to understand that to which he is consenting and to
give an "informed" consent to it. Age should be an irrelevant consideration to a determination of the validity of a consent whether for private
law or criminal law purposes. Where the minor is unable to give an
"informed" consent his parents or guardian would consent on his behalf

provided the treatment is for the benefit of the minor. Should they refuse,

court authorization would be sought except in the case of an emergency.
It is suggested that the provinces should adopt the Uniform Medical

Consent of Minors Act' 65 which provides that:

1. In this Act 'medical treatment' includes
(a) surgical and dental treatment,
(b) any procedure undertaken for the purpose of diagnosis,
160. R.R.(., 1970, I. 729 oamarm. I(XI/74,.sm. 49, 49(a). Also McL.ellan, Jehovah's Witnesses and Child Protection
Legislation: The Right to Refuse Medical Consent (1977), Leg. Med. Q. 37.
161. 1.SO. 1970, c. 378 as am.
162. See. also Infants Act, R.S..LC. 1960, c. 193, s. 23. Uniform Medical Consent of Minors Act 1975, Proceedings
IJniform Law Conference of Aanada 11(2. Some Ontario Hospitals require parental consent for abortion
up to the age of eightecn. It has al , been questioned whether a sixteen year old can consent to a
non-therapeutic irreversible proedure such as contraceptive sterilization.
16:1. l.Q., 1972, c. 42.
10;4. Id. art. 32.
165. 1974 Prceedings Uniform Law Conference 162.
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(c) any procedure undertaken for the purpose of preventing any disease or ailment,
(d) any procedure undertaken for the purpose of preventing pregnancy, and

(e) any procedure that is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to that treatment.
2. The law respecting consent to medical treatment of persons who have attained the
age of majority applies, in all respects, to minors, who have attained the age of
sixteen years in the same manner as if they had attained the age of majority.
3.(11' The consent to medical treatment of a minor who has not attained the age of
sixteen years is as effective as it would be if he had attained the age of majority
where, in the opinion of a legally qualified medical practitioner or dentist attending
tlhe minor, supported by the written opinion of one other legally qualified medical
practitioner or dentist, as the case may be,
(a) the minor is capable of understanding the nature and consequences of the medical
treatment, and
(b) the medical treatment and the procedure to be used is in the best interests of the
minor and his continuing health and well-being.
(2) The consent of a minor who has not attained the age of sixteen years or of his
parent or guardian is not required in relation to medical treatment performed with
respect to that minor where
(a) the minor is incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of the
medical treatment or, being capable of understanding the nature and consequences of the medical treatment, is incapable of communicating his consent to
the medical treatment, and
(b) a legally qualified medical practitioner or dentist attending the minor is of the
opinion that the medical treatment is necessary in an emergency to meet
imminent risk to the minor's life or health.
4.(1) Where the consent of a parent or guardian to medical treatment of a minor is
required by law and is refused or otherwise not obtainable, any person may apply to
(insert court as appropriate to the jurisdiction) for an order dispensing with the
consent.
(2) The court shall hear the application in a summary manner and may proceed ex
pazrte or otherwise and, where it is satisfied that the withholding of the medical
treatment would endanger the life or seriously impair the health of the minor, may by
order dispense with the consent of the parent or guardian to such medical treatment
ais is specified in the order.
5. Where, by or under this Act, the consent of the parent or guardian of a minor to his
medical treatment is not required or is dispensed with, the medical treatment does not
fcr the reason that the consent of the parent or guardian was not obtained, constitute
a trespass to the person of the minor.

In the case of a mental patient, the person authorized by law to
represent him may consent to treatment that is beneficial to the
patient.16 In the common law provinces where the patient is not under
guardian3hip or in the absence of other legal authorization, it is
customary to seek the consent of those able to take legal proceedings,
such as a relative or hospital administrator whose powers are confined to
consenting to procedures creating little risk of harm.

It is suggested that, as in the case of minors, the mental patient's

consent should be sufficient if he is capable of appreciating fully the
nature and consequences of a particular operation or of a particular

treatment. Otherwise, in the absence of an emergency, consent should be
given by a committee especially appointed for this purpose provided the

treatment or operation is of therapeutic nature.
(b) Absence of Consent

When the patient has given no consent or refuses to give his consent to

treatment or to an. operation of a therapeutic nature that is for his benefit,
no protection is given to the physician or surgeon1 6 7 unless, in the case of
166. MayrUnd, supra, n. 23 at 50.
167. Criminal Code, a. 244.
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a surgical operation an emergency situation exists and the operation is
for the benefit of the patient. 16 In emergency cases, it is also presumed
that everyone desires medical treatment. The patient's consent is said to
be implied although it is not "informed". Thus, liability is still possible.
Does the treatment without consent or upon consent that is null and
void, by ingestion of a prescribed drug constitute a criminal assault? It
does not appear to be so unless force is used or it was against the will of a
patient who took the drug.
It is submitted that the doctrine of necessity should exonerate a
physician or surgeon in cases where the patient opposes the therapeutic
treatment or operation especially when children or pregnant women are
involved and lack of treatment or operation would endanger the patient's
life or that of the unborn child.1 69 In the United States in such cases, some
courts have substituted their consent for that of the adult patient or legal
representative of a minor or incompetent patient. 70 Judicial interference
in the face of patient opposition should certainly be countenanced in
cases where the life of the patient is at stake. 71 It is also suggested that
non-intentional injury could be criminal negligence 72 in the absence of
malpractice where consent was not given and no emergency existed. To
some extent sections 204 and 244 of the Criminal Code overlap.
(c) Proposal
It may be advisable to have a section in the Criminal Code dealing
with the protection of the individual that would make a distinction
between assault where the treatment is administered or the operation
performed against the express wishes of the patient or his representatives
and the case where consent was not obtained at all. The text could also
deal with the conditions of validity (for instance, the requirements of
"informed" consent) of such consent and declare that no civil and
criminal liability exists when an operation or treatment takes place in an
emergency without the patient's consent and it is for his benefit. This text
would replace or modify sections 45, 198, and 244 of the Criminal Code.
3. Therapeutic Treatment in Which Clinical Research
Is Combined with ProfessionalCare
We are concerned here with the individual therapeutic experiment or
innovative therapy taking place when a critically ill patient is not
responding to the standard or prescribed treatment for his disease.
Frequently, such innovative therapy involves a patient suffering from a
fatal disease.
As a last resort, the physician will administer the patient an untried or
even potentially dangerous drug, or attempt a new type of operation, for
instance a heart transplant, knowing that the chances of success may be
very slim. In these cases, the experiment or innovative therapy may
advance the state of medicine without further jeopardizing the patient's
life. Since the prime purpose of the experiment or innovative therapy is to
save the patient's life, it would seem that this therapeutic aspect should
not modify the traditional relationship existing between the patient's
I(A. Id.

s, 45, 188.
161. In general see Skegg, A ,lustifiration for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent (1974), 90 L.Q. Rev.
512.
1701. .Sev, e.g., Application of the President of Georgetown College (1.964), 201 A. 2d 537 (N.J. Sup. Ct). Contra: Re
Brooks Estate (1965), 205 N.E. 2d 415 (Il1. Sup. CO)
171. S,o lso Raleigh-Fitkin Memorial Hospital v. Anderson (1964), 201 A. 2d 537 (N.J. Sup. Ct.).
172. C riminal Code, si. 202, 201, 201.
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faith and the physician's fiduciary duty. The same rules should be applied
here as in the case of customary therapy. An "informed" consent must be
obtained from the patient. The fact that the new drug or the new type of
operation may be life-saving or of no value at all should not modify this
conclusion as long as the patient is informed of the risks involved and of
theFor
chances of success.
instance, in the case of a transplantation operation,
the type of
risk involved and the novelty of the operation should have a bearing on
the completeness of the disclosure required. In order for the consent to be
knowing and voluntary, the recipient is entitled to full disclosure of all
possible serious direct and collateral hazards.
Of course, the surgeon's duty does not mean that he must apprise the
patient of each infinitestimal or speculative element making up such
risks, as it would often be psychologically harmful to frighten him with
too remote possibilities. Actually, in the light of the possible undesirable
effects of disclosure of some medical or surgical risks on a number of
patients, it might be better to treat disclosure as a question of negligence
involving professional standards of conduct only. This approach,
however, should not be applied to experimentation. Furthermore, today,
the trend in standard of disclosure is clearly away from professional
standards to lay ones.
Innovative therapy may pose known risks as well as unknown ones. If
the physician fails to disclose to his patient a known material risk of the
proposed innovative therapy he may be civilly or criminally liable if such
a risk materializes. 173 If on the other hand, the general nature of the
treatment or operation including the fact that it is experimental is
understood and the collateral risks fully disclosed, no assault charge
could be laid against the physician under section 244 of the Criminal
Code. However, consent to reckless experimenentation should be against
public policy even if its purpose were to seek a cure. This would include
auto-experimentation where the investigator takes unwarranted risks
with his own health in pursuit of his investigation. The effect of the
patient's consent would depend on the propriety of using the innovative
therapy in the first place. For instance, homoplastic transplants are not
against public policy as long as they are performed within the limits set
by the various provincial Human Tissue Acts or the provisions of the
Quebec Civil Code. Blood transfusions are also legal. In both cases
consent must be obtained. On the other hand, heteroplastic transplants
may have to be prohibited even where the patient's consent has been
obtained as they have never been successful.
Where the use of an innovative procedure is negligent in light of its
known and significant collateral risks, the physician has breached his
duty of care to the patient in the manner of treatment. Thus, the patient's
consent to disclosed risks becomes irrelevant. In other words, the use of
an innovative therapy should constitute good medical practice under the
circumstances. The patient's consent should not be a complete answer to
every problem posed by innovative therapy. 74 For obvious reasons a
physician has no legal duty to disclose to a patient risks which he does
not know or should not know. However, if the innovative therapy raises
17:1. ,ei),' I lnratin , f
elainki I th4 Lim revisd in 'Ilkyij in 1975, ii. :. Medical Research Combined with
'ro, siiouil Care. Also Cryderman v. Ringrose, supra, n. 27.
171 But s-' Ethical (uidelines for Clinical Investigatin by the Armerican Medical Ase,iation and Ieecher,
Cu
v ,nt in Clinical Experinientation: Myths and Reality (19664). 195 J.A.M.A. :34. Also Crvderman v.
Ringrse. supra, n. 27,
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too many unanswered questions, it would be unreasonable for a physician
to go ahead with the therapy even if the patient had consented to
unknown risks.
Children and prisoners do not seem to present particular problems
when innovative therapy is applied to them. This is not necessarily the
case with respect to persons affected by behavioural disturbances. Should
the use of new techniques call for the application of special rules on the
ground that it is difficult to obtain an adequately informed consent from
the patient, his parents or guardian? Several questions readily come to
mind: is the patient himself competent to consent when he allegedly has
some neurological or psychological defect necessitating the treatment?
May a third party consent for an incompetent if the potential risks of the
treatment outweigh the probable and possible benefits to the subject? Do
the numerous unknowns inherent in the new technique prevent the
physician or surgeon from adequately informing and advising the patient
or his representatives as "informed" consent requires?
(a) Psychosurgery
Experimental surgical alteration of behaviour, called psychosurgery,
which involves the removal or destruction of tissue and nerve cells in the
brain deemed to be responsible for the undesirable behaviour,1' 7 although
still at the experimental stage, is generally considered as primarily
therapeutic. However, if healthy or non-affected brain tissue or nerve cells
are also destroyed they will not regenerate, for the effect of psychosurgery
is irreversible. In most cases where psychosurgery is used, mental
patients do not respond to drug therapy or other generally accepted modes
of psychiatric treatment. It would seem that if the new technique is
it should
subject to serious controversy as to its potential curative effect,
176
only be authorized in extreme cases and with great caution.
In the United States of America in Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health 77 the court was of the opinion that psychosurgery
should never be performed on an involuntarily confined person. 7 "
79
The court said:
Experimental psychosurgery, which is irreversible and intrusive, often leads to the

blunting of emotions, the deadening of memory, the reduction of affect, and limits the
ability to generate new ideas. Its potential for injury to the creativity of the individual is
great, and can impinge upon the right of the individual to be free from interference with
his mental processes.

In the court's view three elements are necessary for consent. (1)
competence, (2) knowledge, and (3) voluntariness. The court also pointed
out that mental patients cannot reason as equals with physicians and
mental hospital administrators. A patient involuntarily confined may not
be able to give a voluntary consent because of the real or imagined
pressures on him. The court even accepted the view that such duress may
175. Brain surgery involves the removal of diseased brain cells to relieve organic disorders such as tumors.
176. See Heldman, Behavior Modification and Other Legal Imbroglios of Human Experimentation (1974-75), 52J.
of Urban L. 157; Zwerdling, Informed Consent and the Mental Patient: California Recognizes a Mental

Patient's Right to Refuse Psychosurgery and Shock Treatment (1974-75), 15 Santa Clara Lawyer 725;
Spoonhour, Psychosurgery and Informed consent (1974), 26 U. of Florida L. Rev. 432; Sitnick, Major
Tranquilizers in Prison: Drug Therapy and the Unconsenting Inmate (1975), 11 Willamette L.J. 378; Mearns,
Law and the Physical Control of the Mind: Experimentation in Psychosurgery (1975), 25 Case Western L. Rev.
565,
177. (197:1)42 U.S.L.W. 206:3 (Mich.); notes Fabri (1973), 51 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 526; Gold (1974), 4 N.Y.U. Rev. ofL.
& Social Change 207.
178. The patient was an alleged murderer and rapist confined to a state hospital because of his homicidal rages.
179. Supra, n. 177 at 2064.
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extend to one voluntarily confined.1 80 As long as the experimental
treatment has such proportionately high risks compared to the benefits to
the patient, no consent could ever be adequately "informed".
(b) Adversive Therapy
Adversive therapeutic techniques have also been the subject of
criticism by the American courts especially when prisoners are involved.' 5
To conclude, it would seem that in therapeutic experiments in which
clinical research is combined with professional care, additional protection
is needed for those mentally infirm especially if they are institutionalized
since they may lack either the competence or the autonomy or both to
give an "informed" consent. Furthermore whether or not the patient has
been determined to be legally incompetent should not be the sole criterion
used hi determining whether or not he is able to give an "informed"
consent.
In California, in response to the need for regulating the use of
dangerous and controversial innovative treatment on patients without
their consent, the legislature has adopted a law which provides that
mental patients have the right to choose whether to submit to
psychosurgery or shock treatment in California mental institutions.' 82
Before a physician can administer these procedures, the patient must
"know:ingly and intelligently, without duress or coercion, manifest
consent to the treatment". Prior to seeking the patient's consent the
physician must give him: 8 3
1. an explanation
2. an explanation
3. an explanation
4. an explanation
5. an explanation
6. an explanation

of the procedures used in performing the treatment;
of the nature and seriousness of the patient's disorder;
of the patient's right to revoke consent before or during the procedure;
of reasonable alternative therapies;
of uncertainties associated with the treatment; and
of the hazards associated with the procedures.

To be able to accept psychosurgery or shock treatment, the patient
must be capable of giving an "informed" consent. Capacity to consent is
determined not by a superior court but by a review committee comprised
of physicians. If the committee determines that the patient cannot give an
informed consent to psychosurgery, such procedure cannot take place.
However, the committee can authorize shock treatment over the patient's
objections if it determines that such treatment is necessary.
In view of the serious risks involved in these techniques, it would seem
that the issue of capacity to consent should be determined in the same
manner as that used to determine mental capacity during a commitment
or guardianship proceeding conducted by a court.
4. Non-Therapeutic, Non-Experimental Treatment
(a) With or Without Benefit to the Patient
In principle, a treatment or operation which is not intended to improve
the physical or mental health of a patient should be prohibited. His
180. See also Medical News (1973), 225 JAM.A. 1035. 1036, 1044, where two cases are reported: one where the

court stayed psychosurgery on the ground of the patient's inability to give consent; and the other where the

plaintiff was held not to have been adequately informed of the risk in the procedure.
181. See, e.g., Mackey v. Procunier (1973), 477 F. 2d 877 (9th Cir.); Knecht v. Gillman 11973), 488 F. 2d 1163 (8th
Cir.).
I82. Cal. Stats (1974), c. 1534, at 4:128 (West Legislative Service).
183. Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code, § 5326.3 (West Supp. 1975).
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consent should null and void for illicit cause or consideration and thus
contrary to public policy. However, exceptions to this principle should
18 4
be recognized. For instance, esthetic or cosmetic treatment or surgery,
the purpose of which is to beautify the patient, although not intended
to improve his physical health, often has the effect of improving his
mental health. For this reason, it is of a beneficial nature and, provided
an informed consent has been obtained, the procedure should not be
prohibited. Where the removal of physical defects is dangerous and
threatens the health of the patient, it should not be allowed and the
patient's consent should be null and void as contrary to public policy.
A change of sex or surgical transsexualism would seem to be justified
for therapeutical reasons only 88 if its purpose is to cure the patient's
psychological disorders as this type of operation often involves serious
physical and psychological risks to the patient. 186 The patient must give
an informed consent. The physician must explain to him that it is really
not possible to alter a person's sex. Only the appearances of sex can be
changed. Transsexualism is a matter of public policy which in certain
cases should not be affected by consent. Thus, the operation may amount
to causing bodily harm. 187 However, if the operation can prevent the
deterioration of the patient's mental health it is therapeutic and consent
to it should be effective.
Maiming which is covered by section 228 of the Criminal Code does
not seem to take consent into consideration. 188
Sterilization

Sexual sterilization is the process whereby a male or female person is
deprived of his or her ability to procreate. Sterilization can involve total
surgical removal of all or some of the reproductive organs, for instance
castration in the male, and removal of the uterus (histerectomy), ovaries
or fallopian tubes in the female. A less drastic form of sterilization
prevents procreation without the removal of any organs, for instance
vasectomy in the male and tubal ligation in the female.
Sterilization can be divided into three types: therapeutic, eugenic and
contraceptive. 189 There can be no doubt that sterilization is legal when
performed for therapeutic reasons, provided the patient has given a free
and informed consent to the operation. 190
There is no Canadian legislation or case law directly dealing with this
question. In England or Canada all judicial references to the issue of
sterilization have been obiter. Thus, in Bravery v. Bravery,'9 ' Lord
Denning conceded that vasectomy for health or eugenic reasons was
permissible, for instance where the wife's health would be endangered by
any further pregnancies or where sexual intercourse could result in the
184. See Kelly v, Hazlett, supra, n. 2;.
185. Mayrand, supra, n. 23 at 34.

186. Se Brent, Some Legal Problems of the Post-operative Transsexual (1972-73), 12 J. of Fain. L. 405; Kouri,
Transsexualism in the Province of Quebec (1973), 4 R.D.U.S. 167: Kouri, Certain Legal Aspects of Modern
Medicine (1975); also Corbett v. Corbett, [ 19711 P. 83.

187. Criminal Code, a. 228.
88. Supra, n. 70.
189. Dickens, Eugenic Recognition in Canadian Law (1975), 13 Oagoode L.J. 556. See also Anonymous, Comments
Upon the Law Relating to Abortion and Sterilization (19il), 3 Man. Bar News .38; Black, Abortion and
Sterilization (1961), 33 Man. lar News 38; Oldershow, Contraception. Abortion and Sterilization (1975); Kouri,
Certain Legal Aspects of Modern Medicine (1975).
190. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 101 (1958). See also Criminal Code, s. 45.
191. 119451 I W.L.R. 1169,[195413 All E.R. 56 (C.A.).
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transmission of an hereditary disease. However, in his dissenting
judgment, his Lordship expressed the view that sterilization for purely
contraceptive reasons opens the way to licentiousness. Furthermore, he
was of the opinion that if there was no "just cause or excuse" for the
operation, it was unlawful even if the man had consented to it.192 This
opinion carries questionable weight, not only because it is obiter but also
because the rest of the court took care to disjoin themselves from it. The
court in Bravery, however, seems to recommend that both spouses'
conseint be obtained prior to sterilization. This view was supported in an
Ontario Supreme Court case, which involved a therapeutic sterilization. 93
Since sterilization, apart from constituting an aggression upon the
body of the spouse submitting to the operation, amounts to an
infringement of the right to procreation of both spouses, it would seem to
be reasonable to require the consent of both parties, especially where the
operation is for contraceptive purposes only. There may, however, be
special circumstances justifying sterilization of a consenting spouse even
in the absence of the other spouse's consent. Furthermore, in many
jurisdictions, married persons possess medical autonomy. 194
By virtue of the dearth of judicial pronouncements on the issue, it is
necessary to turn to the Criminal Code for directions. Perhaps the most
relevant section is section 45 which has already been discussed in this
article. It could be argued that the words "for the benefit of that
person" found in the section should be given a wider interpretation than
that which they are usually accorded, that is physical benefit.1 95 Can it
not be argued that if a couple who cannot afford to have more children
choose sterilization as a solution, they are receiving a benefit from the
operation? Or the benefit can even be construed as the emotional relief of
knowing one need no longer worry about an unwanted pregnancy. Surely,
the argument concludes, it is not up to the Criminal Code to legislate that
people cannot choose what constitutes a benefit to them.
Another section that could be applied to sterilization is section 228 of
the Criminal Code which deals with causing bodily harm with intent,
especially maiming.
Ma:iming is defined as follows:
:. to cripple or mutilate in any way, to inflict upon a person any injury which deprives
him of the use of any limb or member of the body, or renders him lame or defective in
bodily vigor; to inflict bodily injury; to seriously wound or disfigure; disable.9 8

While it is doubtful that this definition would describe a tubal ligation
or vasectomy, it could be applied to castration or a medically unnecessary
hysterectomy. Since consent is not mentioned in the section, it could be
argued that once the intent to maim has been proved, the consent of the
victim is irrelevant. However, this requires a brief look at judicial dicta as
to when consent renders an illicit act legal.
IW. Id.at 1180 (W.L.R.).
197.Chivers and Chivera v. Weaver and McIntyre (1947), unreported, per Kelly J.,referred to in Blaier,
Sterilization in Canada: Some Legal and Social Considerations (1977, unpublished paper, Osgoode Hall Law
School). Crydernman v. Ringrose, supra, n. 27 did not involve the legality of sterilization but the liability of the
physician in negligence for performing an experimental sterilization on a patient without sufficiently
informing her of the unreliability of this new procedure or of the possible damage to the uterus and unborn
child. No reference was made to the consent of the patient's husband. Note that parental consent may
not allow sterilization of a minor on eugenic or contraceptive grounds: Re D, 119761 1 All E.R. 326. In
Sparkman v. MeFarlin 522 F. 2d 172 (1977), it was held that a judge is not immune for granting a
mother's rerluest forthe sterilization of her fifteen year old daughter.
194. Seee.g., FJmily Law Reform Act, 1975, S.O.,
1975, c.41, a, 1(2).
195. See Rlaier, supra, n. 193, at 10.
196. Black's law Dictionary 1131 (4th ed., 1968).
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The most general
statement is probably that of Stephen J. in The
197
Queen v. Coney:
The principle as to consent seems to me to be this: When one person is indicted for
inflicting personal injury upon another, the consent of the person who sustains the
injury is no defence to the person who inflicts the injury, if the injury is of such a
nature . . that its infliction is injurious to the public as well as to the person
injured.1 98

It would seem that most maims are contrary to public interest since
our society, while emphasizing individual liberty, protects certain fundamental rights, such as bodily integrity. Thus, a man who requests to have
his healthy arm cut off will probably find that his consent does not relieve
the surgeon from criminal or civil liability. By analogy, the surgical
removal of reproductive organs would be against public policy where the
State does not favour birth control and encourages the raising of large
families. Consent to such an operation would be illegal and void. On the
other hand, it could be argued that where a legal question is uncertain, it
should always be resolved in favour of individual liberty. 199 Glanville
Williams feels that "where the defendant has no intention to defraud or to
make himself a charge upon others, the pain or wound that he chooses
to
200
inflict upon himself is not generally a matter of public concern".
In 1970, the Canadian Medical Protective Association recommended
that sterilization for contraceptive purposes should be a matter to be
decided solely by the doctor20 and the patient involved, as in other cases of
non-therapeutic treatment. '
If it is argued that sterilization for non-therapeutic purposes is against
public policy, it does not seem possible, in accordance with the "clean
hands" doctrine of equity, to permit a sterilized patient who has
"consented" to sterilization to sue his doctor for damages. The restriction
would have to be criminally enforced by the police and prosecuted by
Crown attorneys, which would in turn call for a Criminal Code section
clearly making sterilization illegal. Since there is nothing in the Criminal
Code expressly forbidding sterilization, it can be argued that it is legal
on the assumption that everything is legal unless forbidden by law.
There can also be little doubt that any sterilization without the express
consent of the patient would open the way to criminal prosecution as
well as civil action.
Eugenic sterilization was once provided for in British Columbia and
Alberta 20 2 in the case of mentally retarded people as well as those likely to
transmit certain hereditary diseases. Both Acts have now been
repealed. 0 ' It is interesting to note that the inmate consent was still
required by the British Columbia Act which in section 6 provided that:
The operation directed by the order of the Board of Eugenics in any case shall not be
performed unless the inmate has consented thereto in writing, if in the opinion of the
Board the inmate is capable of giving consent, or, if in the opinion of the board the
inmate is not capable of giving consent, unless the husband or wife of the inmate or, in
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

(l 42),
8 Q.B.D. 534.
Id. at 549.
Williams, supra, n. 190 at 106.
Williams, Consent and Public Policy, 119621 Cr. L. Rev. 74 at 155.
Maier, supra, n. 193 at 10.
R.S.B.C. 1960, c. N53; R.S.A. 1970,.c.341. For further discussion, see Blaier,supra, n. 193, as well as McWhirter
and Weijer. The Alberta Sterilization Act: A Genetic Critique (1969). 19 U.T.L.J. 424.

20:3. The Sterilization Repeal Act, S.A. 1972, c. 87; The Sterilization Repeal Act, S.B.C. 1973, c.79; In New Zealand
see Contraception, Sterilization and Abortion Act 1977, Bill No. 57-1, ss. 7-13, which provides for the
sterilization by court order of any person who is mentally subnormal.
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case the inmate is unmarried, the parent or guardian of the inmate has consented
thereto in writing, or, in case the inmate has no husband, wife, parent, or guardian
resident in the Province, the Provincial Secretary has consented thereto in writing.

With respect to a mentally defective person, sterilization should be
lawful if it is done for his benefit and with the consent of his parent or
guardian. 20 3a . However, a merely involuntary eugenic sterilization
should be ruled out.
Sterilization must be voluntary. Thus, in the case of the prisoners, 20 4
they should not be forced or bribed to consent. For instance, prisoners
sentenced for indeterminate terms or for life may not be capable of
completely free choice since their range of options is severely restricted by
the indeterminate or life sentences. Where there is a possibility of early
release, does coercion nullify free consent? A reasonable view would be
that firee consent could be obtained even in total institutions. Since in
some jurisdictions the law allows certain choices made under the pressure
of avoiding or reducing incarceration, as in the case of plea bargaining,
there is no reason why a prisoner could not give a valid consent. However,
one should not allow someone to buy his freedom by cutting such an
important part of himself.
(b) Without Benefit to the PatientBut for the Direct Benefit of Another
An operation upon a healthy individual with a view to effecting
eventually the cure of another person is certainly licit. Blood transfusions
as well as the grafting of organs, skin or limbs of a healthy individual
upon an ailing patient are licit provided such operations do not imperil
the life or health of the donor. Of course the operation must be performed
in accordance with scientifically approved methods as in the case of
therapeutic operations and the donor's "informed" consent must have
been freely given. No consent can justify the transplant of an organ
without which the donor cannot live (for instance, the heart) irrespective
of his motives. Nor should it be possible to transplant organs such as
sexual glands if such an operation is considered against public policy. In
the case of a live donor it is doubtful that the doctrine of emergency 20 5 or
necessity could ever be applied.
As in therapeutic situations, failure to disclose the risks, known to the
surgeon, invalidates the donor's consent. Thus, even though the donor
has signed a written consent, it might not exonerate the surgeon from
civil or criminal liability if it is possible to prove that he withheld facts
that were necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent to the
transplant. The surgeon must not minimize the known dangers of the
operation in order to induce his patient's consent. However, in discussing
the element of risk involved in the transplantation, the surgeon has such
discretion as is consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an
informed consent.
A transplant operation is especially serious for the live donor who
should be given adequate explanations to help him decide whether he
would rather forego surgery than submit to it. There is always the danger
that an overly enthusiastic transplant team may not disclose all that is
relevant to the operation in order to prevent the prospective donor from
20;:;a. Note that parental consent may not allow sterilization of a minor on eugenic or contraceptive grounds:

Re D, 119761 1 All E.R. 326. By analogy, it may be argued that in the case of a mentally defective person,
parental or guardian consent should be legally inadequate.
204. Assuming that surgical castration is effective for modifying compulsive sexual behaviour.
20,. Criminal Code, a. 45.
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withdrawing his consent. Obviously, an unconscious person who has not
given prior consent should never be a donor. Of course, when there is an
active misrepresentation on the part of the surgeon, the consent given is
invalid.
It could be argued that a live donor should not be able to consent to a
serious operation upon himself for the benefit of another, especially when
as a result of the removal of the donated organ, his health may be
seriously endangered with only the prospect of a moderate prolongation
of the receiver's life. Some day the donor could be in need of the missing
organ.
The Quebec Civil Code allows a person of full age to consent in writing
to the disposal inter vivos of a part of his body provided that the assumed
risk is not disproportionate to the benefit anticipated. The alienation must
be gratuitous unless its object is a part of the body susceptible of
Gift Acts in force in the
regeneration. 20 6 The various Human Tissue
20 7
common law provinces also provide that:
Any person who has attained the age of majority, is mentally competent to consent, and
is able to make a free and informed decision may in a writing signed by him consent to
the removal forthwith from his body of the tissue specified in the consent and its
implantation in the body of another living person.

Stricter standards should be applied to the donor's consent than to the
recipient's consent. For instance, in the case of a live donor, it may be
advisable to assess his physical and psychiatric health as a condition
precedent to his giving an organ. This examination could be made by a
board consisting of an independent physician, the surgeon who will carry
out the transplantation operation and a representative of the hospital
where the operation will be performed or of the Department of Health.
Another solution would be to require the donor's consent to be given to a
judge or magistrate of his domicile, or residence or of the district in which
the transplantation will take place. The judge or magistrate or the
medical board would make sure that the volunteer donor is free from
undue influence. This is particularly important in the case of prisoners.
Actually, it is better to refuse transplants from persons under restraint,
although it may be inequitable to prevent them from making a sacrifice
for a loved one in desperate need. Where there is evidence that strong
pressures are exercised on the donor, he skould not be allowed to give
consent. Finally, it is essential that the consent of the donor be revocable
at any time. The legislation presently in force in Canada does not contain such elaborate methods for insuring free consent.
In the case of minors, when the operation is for the benefit of another,
the consent of both the parent or guardian and minor should not be
dispensed with under any circumstances. Actually, from a public policy
point of view, it is advisable to prohibit any operation that is not
beneficial to the child. Another approach would be to obtain the court's
authorization. For instance, the court's authorization was obtained for the
first time in Massachusetts in 1957 when several requests were made for
the transplantation of a kidney in identical twins who were under 21
years of age. In order to be fully protected against possible criminal and
civil liability, the hospital trustees and surgical staff of the Peter Bent
206. Art. 20. In France see Projet de r4forme du Code civil: Droits de In personnalitt, art. 4, alinen 1: L'acte par
lequel une personne dispose de tout ou partie de son corps est interdit Iorsqu'il doit recevoir effet avant le d~cbs
du disposant, sil a pour effet de porter une atteinte grave et definitive h l'integrit6 du corps humain."
207. E.g., Ontario Act, supra, n. 13, a. 3(1).
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Brigham Hospital in Boston sought a declaratory judgment as to whether
they should be allowed to perform such a transplantation. In Masden v.
Harrison20 8 and in two other cases, 20 9 the court
authorized the hospital
210
and surgeons to proceed with the operations.
In each of the three cases, the court relied upon the testimony of the
parents, the fact that the donor and recipient had given their consent
after being fully informed of the nature of the operation and its possible
consequences, and psychiatric evidence indicated that grave emotional
disturbance could affect the health and physical well-being of the donor if
the operation could not take place, and that the recipient would die as a
result of the refusal. Thus, the operation was deemed to be for the benefit
of the donor as well as of the recipient. Actually the benefit was more the
prevention of a possible detriment to the donor. These operations involved
twinal, and it is questionable whether this argument could be invoked
when the donor and the recipient are not related.
It must be noted that in these cases the court pointed out to the
hospital and the surgeon the importance of obtaining not only the
consent of the parents but also the consent of each of the twins after they
had been fully informed of the nature of the operation and its possible
consequences, and it was clear that each understood the situation. The
minors involved. were at least fourteen years old. Would their consent
have been required if they had been younger or incapable of understanding the operation and its consequences?
As3suming that medically it is feasible and advisable to transplant
organs from small children, it would seem wrong for a court to allow the
operation on the donor, even if parental consent has been obtained. The
courts or the parents should not be allowed to deprive a child of one of his
vital organs without his consent or his intelligent comprehension. 2 11
Whether a minor donor close to maturity should be able to give his
consent if he is intelligent enough to understand the nature and
consequences of his act is a difficult question to answer. As in the case of
adult donors some control is needed to make sure that the minor's consent
is the result of his own decision free from pressure and coercion. In the
case of a recipient minor the situation is different.
Aithough it is difficult to determine the precise age under which a
child should have no capacity to assent to an operation, it would seem
that a child less than sixteen years old is too young to give a valid
consent under some circumstances. Public policy demands legal protection of the personal rights as well as the property rights2 12 of individuals
who are incapable of intelligent decision by reason of their youth.
108. No. 68651 Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957.
:109. Huskev v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., August 30, 1957; Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 Eq.
Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957. See also Hart v. Brown (1972), 289 A. 2d 386, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, noted,
Allensworth (1972), 4 Texas Tech. L. Rev. 244.
210. For an analysis of the cases, see Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantationin Minors (1959), 34
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 891.
2l1. In Bonner v. Moran (1941), 126 F. 2d 121 (D.C.), a case involving a 15-year-old donor, the Court of Appeals
was of the opinion that the Trial Judge had erred in charging that if the jury believed that the boy himself

was capable of appreciating and did appreciate the nature and consequences of the operation and actually
consented or by his conduct impliedly consented, the verdict must be for the surgeon. The court rejected s.
59(l) of the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, which takes the view that if the minor
is capable of appreciating the consequences of the invasion and gives an informed consent, there is no
liability even though the parent or guardian has not consented. See also a.892. In England, a child 16 years of
age may validly consent to an operation: Family Law Reform Act, supra, n. 159, a. 8(1).
212. In the case of a donor of a transplant who is a minor, the issue does not appear to be one of property law.
Thus it is not necessary to obtain the judicial approval which is often required when dealing with property
rights of a minor.
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When the donor of a transplant is of unsound mind, authorization for
the operation should be obtained from the person in whose custody or care
the patient has been committed. Morally or ethically
it would be wrong to
2 13
allow a mentally deficient person to be a donor.
In the common law provinces that have a Human Tissue Act in force,
persons who have not attained the age of majority or are mentally
incompetent persons who are unable to make a free and informed decision
cannot give a valid consent for the purposes of the Act. However, if any of
these persons gives his consent, it is valid if the person who acted upon it
had no reason to believe that the person who gave it had not attained the
age of majority, was not mentally competent to consent, and was not able
to make a free and informed decision, as the case may be. This is a
dangerous provision although it is intended to protect the operating
physician. What is clear from the Act is that parents may no longer
dispose of their minor children's organs or tissue. Control of minors
donating for other than transplantation is governed by general law
which means that parents cannot permit harm to be done to their children.
Since a person under the age of majority, which in Ontario is eighteen,
cannot make a valid inter vivos gift of tissue214 for transplants, this may
cause some difficulties in the case of identical twins who have not
attained the age of majority. Shall one let the other die?
In the Province of Quebec, the Civil Code provides that a minor
capable of discernment, if he is authorized by the person who exercises
paternal authority, and by a judge of the Superior Court may dispose
inter vivos by gratuitous title, of a part of his body provided that no
serious risk to his health results therefrom. His consent must be in
writing and may be revoked. This article is quite liberal. 215
5. Non-Therapeutic Clinical Research in which Experiments
Are Not Expected to Benefit the Subject But Are Designed
to Add to the Understandingof Normal and Diseased States
In the case of non-therapeutic clinical research in which experiments
are not expected to benefit the subject, it could be argued that consent
should be null and void as against public policy. After all, a physician's
sole duty toward his patient is to attempt to achieve a cure. Yet, it must be
recognized that experiments are necessary to add to the understanding of
normal and diseased states in order to develop new treatments or drugs.
Thus, it would be most unwise to forbid all types of experiment. When the
subject is healthy and the experiment is not likely to cause him any
substantial harm or in any way to endanger his life, the experiment is not
against public policy provided it is useful to society. If the experiment is
not a serious one consent to it is not effective. For instance, if the risk is
greater to the subject than the benefit to be derived by society, the
experiment is not a serious one and must be declared illicit.
The consent to a licit experiment must be free and informed. The usual
213. Lausier v. Pescinski (1975), 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W. 2d 180; but see Strunk v. Strunk (1969). 445 S.W. 2d 145

(Ky.); and Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine (1976), 76
Col. L. Rev. 48.
214. "Tissue" includes an organ but does not include any skin, bone, blood, blood constituent or other tissue that is

replaceable by natural processes of repair. This means that minors may be capable of giving, what is not
included in the definition of tissue, provided the rules applicable to them are followed: e.g., consent of the
minor himself if close to maturity or that of the parent or guardian who has control of the minor. In general

see Sharpe, supra, n. 157.
215. See Mayrand, supra, n. 23 at 67 et seq.
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principles of consent apply to experimental medical procedures. However,
because the risk may be more important and there is no benefit to the
subject, he must be informed to a much greater degree than a patient in
the case of therapeutic treatment.
In Canada, in Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan,216 the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that 21 7
...the duty imposed upon those engaged in medical research . .. to those who offer
themselves as subject for experimentation ... is at least as great as, if not greater
than, the duty owed by the ordinary physician or surgeon to his patient. There can be no
exceptions to the ordinary requirements of disclosure in the case of research as there
may well be in ordinary medical practice. The researcher does not have to balance the
probable effect of lack of treatment against the risk involved in the treatment itself. The
example of risks being properly hidden from a patient when it is important that he
should not worry can have no application in the field of research. The subject of medical
experimentation is entitled to a full and frank disclosure of all the facts, probabilities
and opinions which a reasonable man might be expected to consider before giving his
consent.

This passage represents the approach to be followed in the common
law provinces in the absence of statutory provisions dealing with
experimentation on human subjects.
In Quebec, article 20 of the Civil Code allows a person of full age to
submit to an experiment provided that the risk assumed is not
disproportionate to the benefit anticipated. "Experiment" seems to refer
to scientific or non-therapeutic experiments. Although, it is not clear
whether the benefit anticipated must accrue to the healthy subject or to
others, the word benefit must be taken to mean future benefit to persons
other than the one submitting to the experiment. 218 The Quebec Civil
Code does not deal with the requirements of informed consent to an
experiment. However, there is no reason to believe that Quebec courts
would reject the views expressed by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in
the Hclushka case.
The difficulties involved in securing an informed consent in the case of
experiments must not be underestimated. To give one example, often no
one knows what the risks or benefits will be. Thus, under some
circumstances, informed consent alone may not adequately safeguard the
rights of the subject. This is why in the United States of America, in some
cases, additional rules and procedures have been devised for the control of
human experimentation. 219 Should reckless experimentation result in the
death of the subject or his injury, sections 208, 228 or 244 of the Criminal
Code would be applicable and the physician could not rely on section 45
or on the common law defence of necessity. 220
Since 1945, there have been many attempts to lay down guidelines
concerning the requirement of free and informed consent to medical
experiments.
For instance, the Nuremberg Code states in part:221
216. Supra, n.27. See also Cryderman v. Ringrose. supra, n. 27.
217. Per Hall J.A. at 443-444. In the U.S.A. see Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital,supra, n.
27.
218. Bowker, Experimentationon Humans and Gift of Tissue: Articles 20-23 of the Civil
Code (1973), 19 McGill L.J.
161. at 166 and Mayrand, supra, n.23 at 42.
219. A detailed study of these rules is outside the scope of this research. See for instance Ratnoff, Who
Shall Decide
When Doctors Disagree, etc. (1974-75), 25 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 472; Cowan. Human Experimentation:
The Review Process in Practice (1974-75), 25 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 533.
220. Note that the physician may also be liable in tort or in contract. In general see Dickens, Information
for
Consent in Human Experimentation (1974), 24 U.T.L.J. 381: Waddams, Medical Experiments on
Human
Subjects (1967), 25 U.T. Fec. of L. Rev. 25.
221. United States v. Brandt, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
(The Medical
Case) 182-82 (Military Tribunal I,1947).
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1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should
be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of
any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of
constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and
enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the
nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to
be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards. reasonably to be expected; and the effects
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the
experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each
individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and
responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring
the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where
continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.

The Declaration of Helsinki adopted by the eighteenth World Medical
Assembly in 1964 and revised in Tokyo in 1975, contains recommendations for the guidance of physicians doing biomedical research that
involves human subjects.
222
Some of the basic principles are as follows:
9. In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately
informed of the aims, methods, anticipated benefits and potential hazards of the study
and the discomfort it may entail. He or she should be informed that he or she is at
liberty to abstain from participation in the study and that he or she is free to withdraw
his or her consent to participation at any time. The doctor should then obtain the
subject's freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing.
10. When obtaining informed consent for the research project the doctor should be
particularly cautious if the subject is in a dependent relationship to him or her or may
consent under duress. In that case the informed consent should be obtained by a doctor
who is not engaged in the investigation and who is completely independent of this
official relationship.

The ethical principles of various medical associations contain similar
rules. For instance, the Code of Ethics approved by the General Council of
the Canadian Medical Association in June 1975 states:
Before proceeding he [the clinical researcher] will obtain the consent of those
individuals or their agents, and will do so only after explaining the purpose of the
clinical research and any possible health hazard which he can foresee.

The Report of the Consultative Group on Ethics to the Canada Council
published in 1976 contains some very important ethical principles with
respect to informed consent. These principles are quoted in full because
they are the most comprehensive ones on this topic:
The single most important device for resolving the dilemma between the need to respect
the rights of the people participating in research and the need to provide for the
advancement of knowledge is the procedure of informed consent-informing the
potential participants of the nature of the research, the risks and benefits, and allowing
them to decide for themselves whether or not they wish to participate.
It is axiomatic that no research involving humans should be undertaken without their
freely-given, informed consent, if possible in writing, and that investigators should
honor all commitments associated with such agreements. The information given to a
subject should be complete and presented in a way which takes into consideration the
level of his comprehension. An exact description should be provided of all aspects of the
research project, its purpose, usefulness, expected benefits, methods, foreseeable effects,
risks (including possible hazards to physical and psychological well-being and jeopardy
222. See, als
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of social position) and where appropriate, a description of alternative procedures which
might be used. It should be possible to assure subjects that the research in the form to
which. they are giving consent will be closely monitored. Subjects should always be
appriiied of any considerations which might lead them to refuse to participate. At the
same time, an offer should be made to answer inquiries concerning the research. While
the researcher will be the primary person responsible for answering such inquiries, he
should whenever practicable be willing to suggest a second, knowledgeable person, other
than a member of -the research group, if the subject wishes further information and
review concerning the proposed subject.
Since research by its very nature involves the unknown, the subject should understand
that it is unrealistic to expect identification of all possible risks; nonetheless, he should
be reassured that any research procedure which involves risk to the participant has
.
been carefully pretested.
While it is desirable that subjects be informed of the uses to which any of the data
collected will be put:, we recognize that in the case of questionnaires deposited in a data
bank often no single purpose can be specified, as they may later be used in the analysis
of problems unrelated to the original reasons for the data collection. The precautions
initially taken to ensure anonymity of responses may make it impossible to locate the
participants a second time to obtain their informed consent to a new analysis of the
data. This should be explained to participants and a general consent obtained to re-use
data with a guarantee of anonymity.
Informed consent must be freely and explicitly given, without any form of coercion,
constraint or undue inducement. It is accepted that subjects may be remunerated for the
time they give to participating in a project, and that this remuneration may take into
consideration the trouble or inconvenience which their participation involves. However,
other more subtle forms of inducement, such as higher marks or favourable publicity,
are nt permissible. And remuneration ought never to be such as to lead a subject to
ignore the risks involved in participation. Moreover, potential subjects should always be
advised that they may withdraw from the project at any time.
It may not always be possible to obtain written consent, but in cases where this is not
done, the researcher should be required to describe the procedures used to obtain consent
and to give satisfactory reasons for not obtaining written consent.
The consent form itself is the tangible evidence of an act of voluntary co-operation
between the researcher and his subject, based on the subject's understanding of what is
implied in the consent. It is, in effect, a contract, and its purpose is the protection of both
the subject and the researcher and no less the sponsoring institution and community as
a whole.
The form of consent should set out(1) the purpose of the research;
(2) the benefits envisaged;
(3) any inconveniences involved;
(4) the tasks to be performed;
(5) the rights of the subject, i.e., the right to withdraw at any time without penalty,
the right to confidentiality of personal information;
(6) any departures from normal practice being planned by the researcher;
(7) the risks involved;
(8) the name of the person, group or institution eliciting or receiving the consent.
The wording of the consent form should be as similar as possible to the verbal
description given to the subject. The form should provide for hearing any complaint the
subject may subsequently have.
We would emphasize that those participating in a research project should never, either
before or after the experiment, have any reason for saying that they did not fully
understand what was involved. Moreover, while consent alone is never sufficient to
justify research involving humans, it is a prerequisite to carrying it out.
It is uniderstood that in working in the field outside one's own culture, fully informed
consent may be impossible to obtain. In such circumstances, extra care should be taken
by the researcher to protect the interests of participants and third parties in the
research. Moreover, in field research consent should always be obtained from the
appropriate authorities for the use and relocation of objects belonging to the community
under atudy.
We urge the adoption of the following guidelines on informed consent
(1) that with due concern for the limitations of their comprehension, potential
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participants be given a full and fair explanation of the purpose of the research and the
procedures to be followed, together with a careful estimate of the risks and benefits;
(2) that no coercion or other form of undue financial or other inducement be used to
obtain subject participation;
(3) that it be made clear to participants that they may withdraw their participation at
any time, just as the investigator may conclude his research at his own discretion in
the interest of the subjects, the project or himself;
(4) that, where practical, informed consent of both parents and children always be
obtained in respect of research involving children;
(5) that special precautions be taken to protect captive populations from being coerced
into participation;
(6) that participants be explicitly assured of confidentiality;
(7) that participants be apprised of their rights to inquire about the research, and that
whenever practicable they have recourse of a knowledgeable resource person outside the
research group for that purpose;
(8) that informed consent always be obtained in writing and where this is not possible,
that the procedures to be used in obtaining consent be clearly described and open to
examination.

There is no need to add other examples of ethical principles or
as they all contain similar provisions. 223 As noted previousguidelines
ly,2 24 in the United States, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare has codified 225 existing policies for the protection of human
respect to experiments supported by grants from that
subjects with
226
Department.
(a) Minors
The problem of informed consent to non-therapeutic clinical research
eludes solution with respect to those who suffer from some legal
disability.
Should minors be allowed to participate in non-benefit experiments
when they are unable to consent or to comprehend procedures which they
may undergo, or more generally when they are not capable of discernment? Should the parents' consent alone be sufficient, or should a court
participate and be the final arbiter in the decision?
The Helsinki declaration as amended in Tokyo merely states that:
11. In case of legal incompetence, informed consent should be obtained from the legal
guardian in accordance with national legislation. Where physical or mental incapacity
makes it impossible to obtain informed consent, or when the subject is a minor,
permission from the responsible relative replaces that of the subject in accordance with
national legislation.

The principle is not very helpful.
In the United States, Bonner v. Moran227 by implication approves a
minor's participation in a non-therapeutic procedure provided the consent
of the parent has been obtained. Yet this may be questionable when the
procedure is not for the direct benefit of the minor. On the other hand, a
mature minor should be able to validly consent to a scientific experiment.
223. See e.g.. Medical Research Council of Canada, Ethics in Human Experimentation 12, 1634 (1978). Academie
Suisse des Sciences Medicales, Directives pour to recherche experimentale sur I'homme, arts. II 8. III and IV,
(1970). American Psychological Association. Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Research with Human
Subjects (1972). Levine, Guidelines for Negotiating Informed Consent with Prospective Human Subjects of
Experimentation. 22 Clinical Research 42, (1974). Hershey, Miller, Human Experimentation and the Law
(1976).
224. Supra, p. 346.
225. 45 C.F.R, § 46. 1-22 1974). Se, also National Research Service Award Act 1974, Publ. L. No. 93-348, tit. 11,88
Stat. 342,s. 202(aX IXBXC), 42 U.S.C. § 289 I-I. In experiments involving the use of investigational new drugs,
the manner of procuring consent must conform to Fo d and Drug Administration Policy, 21 C.F.R. §§310.
10(h), 316.1 (April 1, 1977).
226. See Ratnoff, supra, n. 219 at 511.512.
227. Supra, n. 211.
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In Quebec, article 20 of the Civil Code allows a minor capable of
discernment to submit to an experiment with the consent of the person
having the paternal authority and of a judge of the Superior Court,
provided that no serious risk to his health results therefrom. This
provis:ion would seem to supersede the principle that a tutor must take
care of his pupil and can only consent to acts for the benefit of his
pupil.28 However, article 20 is restricted to minors capable of discernment. Experiments on minors below the age of discernment appear to be
forbidden.
In the common law provinces, there is no statutory provision dealing
with the question, but it may be assumed that parents and guardians of
minors can give consent on their behalf to any procedures even if they are
of no particular benefit to such minors provided they do not carry some
risk of harm. 29 Minors who are capable of appreciating fully the nature
and consequences of a particular experiment appear to be in the same
position as adults with respect to consent.2 30
Since a strict no-experiment rule would not be realistic, the United
States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has proposed
policies and procedures designed to give special protection to children and
mentally defective persons when they are involved in research, development End demonstration activities funded by federal grants:
1. Children. If the health of children is to be improved, research activities involving

their participation is often essential. Limitation of their capacity to give informed
con-sent, however, requires that certain protections be provided to assure that scientific
importance is weighed against other social vaies in determining acceptable risk to
children. Therefore, research, development, and demonstration activities which involve
risk to children who participate musta. Include a mechanism for obtaining the consent of children who are 7 years of age or
older;
b. Include the applicant's proposal for use of a Protection Committee which is
appropriate to the nature of the activity;
c. Be reviewed and approved, in conformity with present DHEW policy, by an
Organizational Review Committee; and
d. Be reviewed by the appropriate agency Primary Review Committee, the Ethical
Review Board, and the appropriate Secondary Review Group.
4. The mentally infirm. Insofar as the institutionalized mentally infirm might lack
either the competency or the autonomy (or both) to give informed consent, their
participation in research requires additional protection:
a. Research, development and demonstration activities involving the mentally infirm
will be limited to investigations concerning (1) diagnosis, etiology, prevention, or
treatment of the disability from which they suffer, or (2) aspects of institutional life, per
se, or (3) information which can be obtained only from such subjects.
All research, development and demonstration activities involving such persons must
1. Include the applicant's assurance that the study can be accomplished only with the
participation of the mentally infirm;
2. Include the applicant's proposal for use of a Protection Committee which is
appropriate to the activity; and
3. Be reviewed and approved by an Organizational Review Committee, in conformity
23
with present DHEW policy. '

Furthermore:
223. Art. 290 Civil Code.
22!). Howeuer, minors cannot be donors of tissue: see supra, n. 214. Compare Medical Research Council of
Canada, supra, n. 223 at 30-31,
231). In general see McCormick, Proxy Consent in the Experimentation Situation (1974), 2 Perspectives in Biolagy
and Medicine 20; Capron, Legal Considerations Afferting Clinical Pharmacological Studies in Children
(1972), 21 Clin. Hes. 141.
23- See e.g.. Federal Register, Vol. 38. No. 221, Nov. 16, 1973, pp. 31738-:117:19.
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I). Special provisions-1. Consent of both parents. Even where State law may permit
one parent alone to consent to medical care, both parents have an interest in the child,
and therefore, consent of both parents should be obtained before any child may
participate in research activities. Since the risks of research entail the possibility of
additional burdens of care and support, the consent of both parents to the assumption of
those risks should be obtained except when the identity or whereabouts of either cannot
be ascertained or either has been judged mentally incompetent. If the consent of either
parent is not obtained, written explanation or justification should be provided to the
Protection Committee. Consent of school or institutional authorities is no substitute for
parental concern and consent.
2. The childs consent. An important addition to the requirement for parental consent is
the consent of the child subject. Clearly infants have neither the comprehension nor the
independence of judgment essential to consent; older children might or might not have
these capabilities. Although children might not have the capacity to consent on their
own to participate in research activities, they must be given the opportunity (so far as
they are able) to refuse to participate. The traditional requirement of parental consent for
medical procedures is intended to be protective rather than coercive. Thus, while it was
held to be unlawful to proceed merely with the consent of the child, but without consent
of the parent or legal guardian, the reverse should also hold. Therefore, in addition to
consent of both parents, consent of the child subject must also be obtained when the
child has attained the common law "age of discretion" of 7 years, unless the agency
Ethical Review Board specifically exempts a project from this requirement.
3. Exclusions. Despite all the protections afforded by these procedures, certain children
are categorically excluded from participation in research involving risk. These include
children with no natural or adoptive parents available to participate in consent
deliberations and children detained by court order in a residential facility, whether or
not natural or adoptive parents are available.

Although these regulations appear to be sensible, it is suggested that
no one should have the right or authority to subject minors or mentally
incompetent persons to the potential risks of an experiment as parents or
guardians have a duty to act in the interest and for the benefit of the
minor or mentally incompetent person committed to their care.
In Canada the Report of the Consultative Group on Ethics to the
Canada Council (1976) states that:

In view of the possibility of long-range harm, because of their age, developmental and
psychological processes and the problems associated with gaining their informed
consent, we are especially concerned about ethical practices in research on children.
Ideally, we should like to have advocated that only research producing results which
would be directly beneficial to the children involved should be carried out. But the fact is
that, despite the possible overall benefits, most research has minimal, if any, immediate
or direct benefit to those involved in the study. This situation imposes a very heavy
burden of responsibility in the case of research on children, particularly where
behavioural manipulation is involved. Accordingly, we feel that the following safety
measures are in order in addition to those stated elsewhere in this report. The informed
consent of parents should always be obtained for research with minors. In the rare cases
where the precise purpose of the research cannot be divulged to the parents in case they
might try to influence the child's performance, they should always be told of the
procedures to which their child will be subjected. Despite the informed consent of
parents, we believe that any individual child should be able to refuse to participate in
the research study or to withdraw his participation at his own request.
As an extra precaution, institutional review committees should not hesitate to seek
expert advice on the potential short- or long-term risks in a proposed research project
with children if they themselves do not feel competent to make such judgments.
Moreover, we believe that once the research is under way, early monitoring procedures
are important, especially in educational research where experiments are being carried
out with children in learning environments,
We urge the adoption of the following guidelines in respect of research on children:
(1) that the informed consent of parents always be obtained before experimenting with
minors;
(2) that, in the rare cases where the precise purpose of the research cannot be divulged
to the parents, they always be told of the procedures to which their child will be
subjected;
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(3) that each individual child will be given the opportunity to refuse to participate in the
resea:rch or withdraw his participation at his own request;
(4) that review committees seek expert advice, whenever necessary, on potential shortor long-term risks to children;
(5) that early monitoring procedures be employed to uncover any unforeseen risks in
research involving children.

The Working Group on Human Experimentation in its report to the
Medical Research Council on Ethical Considerations in Research
Involving Human Subjects proposes that consent on behalf of those
unable ;o consent for themselves should often involve two stages:
In the first, the parent or legal guardian of the child or the mentally incompetent person
is asked to consent; on behalf of the potential subject, . . If consent is refused at this
level, then that potential subject may not, under any circumstances, be submitted to the
research. Only if consent at this first level is given can the second level of consent be
contemplated.
The iecond level of proxy consent is to be given by a subject advocate or ombudsman.
This person should be attached to, and be an integral part of, the hospital or institution
in which the research is to be performed.
The intent of the second level of proxy consent is to allow recognition of factors of which
the first level of proxy consent may not be aware. It therefore applies primarily to
potential research subjects who are hospitalized or in mental institutions, and with
whom the first proxy may be in only occasional contact.
The above applies to all who are totally incapable of giving an informed consent,
namely young children and those suffering severe mental incapacity. Between these
groups and those with full capacity for consent there are potential subjects who, despite
mental illness or the lack of maturity, are capable to varying degrees of understanding a
research protocol and therefore of consenting on their own behalf. Where such subjects
are involved, the ethics review committee should evaluate risks and benefits in terms of
the capacity of the proposed subjects before determining the extent to which the subjects
should be involved in the consent process and whether one or two levels of proxy
2 32
consent are needed.

(b) Prisoners
Prisoners have been used in medical experimentation since man
conceived prisons. Yet is it possible to consider their consent voluntary
especia1lly when they hope that their participation in research will be
viewed favourably by prison authorities and by the parole board? While
there io no legal or moral objection to the participation of normal
volunteers in research, there are problems surrounding the participation
of volunteers who are confined in an institution. It would seem that the
special status of prisoners requires that they be given special protection
when they participate in research.
Statutes and regulations around the world which deal with experimentation with and research on prisoners range from permission to total bans
of such research. Where any sort of research involving prisoners is
permitted, a requirement that informed consent be obtained is explicitly
set forth. Where financial or other rewards are explicitly covered, they are
generally limited or prohibited.
It is obvious that where liberty is limited, and where freedom of
choice is restricted, there is a corresponding limitation on the capacity to
give a truly voluntary consent. Although the prisoner might be
adequately informed, and competent to make judgments, the voluntariness of his consent remains open to question. For these reasons, in
Canada, the use of prisoners is strongly disapproved if not actually
prohibited.
232. At 31-32 (1978).
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In the United States of America the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare has recommended certain policies and procedures to protect
prisoners participating in a research project which it has funded.
Prisoners can consent to be subjects if adequate safeguards are provided.
Research, development, and demonstration activities involving prisoners
must:
a. Include the applicant's proposal for use of a Protection Committee, which is
appropriate to the nature of the activity;
h. Be reviewed and approved by an Organizational Review Committee which may

already exist in compliance with present DHEW policy or which must be appointed in a
manner approved by the appropriate DHEW agency:
c. Be reviewed by the agency Primary Review Committee; and
d. Be conducted in an institution which is accredited by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare.

The safeguards include: 233
a required certification by a review committee that there are no undue inducements to
participation by prisoners, taking into account the comparability of the earnings
otherwise offered; a requirement that no reduction in sentence or parole in return for
participation in research be offered unless it is comparable to what is offered in return
for other activities; and a provision for accreditation by DHEW of prisons in which
research is to be supported or conducted. A subsequent HEW Notice of Proposed Rule
making dated August 23, 1974 adds a requirement that the review committee also take
into account whether living conditions, medical care, and so on would be better for
participants than those generally available to prisoners, but deletes the provision for
accreditation by DHEW.

The report by the Centre for Law and Health Sciences of the Boston
University School of Law also recommends that provision for accreditation by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare should be
made, to ensure that research will not be conducted:
under such circumstances that participation is the only way for a prisoner to obtain
minimally decent living conditions; that the rewards for participation should not be such
that they provide the only way for a prisoner to maintain his health and personal
hygiene, or induce a person to incur great personal risks; that parole or a reduction in
sentence should never be offered in return for participation in research; that there
should be some provision for the protective role of an independent counselor; that full
information about the research should be given the prospective participant, and that he
should not be asked to waive his rights against anyone for injuries that he might
sustain.

These safeguards would enable a prisoner to give a valid informed
consent to research.
In Canada the Report of the Consultative Group on Ethics to the
Canada Council also deals with research on captive populations:
Another area we believe to be of great sensitivity is research on captive populations,
which we define as individuals or groups who are in a relationship with others involving
a power differential which could operate to their disadvantage as subjects. Thus minors,
prisoners, students, employees, minority groups, incapacitated people and the socially
deprived might well be involved.
The problem here is one of ensuring that consent is not in some way or to some degree
the result of coercion. We (Io not consider the consent of a person in authority to
constitute informed consent of subjects in subordinate positions, Consent of the subjects
themselves should always be obtained. 'l'o ensure that consent is not gained through
subtle pressures being brought to bear on captive subjects, it would seem prudent for
institutional committees reviewing projects to seek advice from someone with special
expertise as to the forces likely to be operating on the captive group, such as how records
:

N.' .. ,.. Ig.
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VI. 12, N,. 10, hm. I.I 1977. at 1076, s' also Herch, Flower, Medical and
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1 )7 . i 1I
(ira. Ilkyis ,51 Tod. No-Thrapcutic
'rs,,i 1-spar 'h:An A alysis,,f Ph entialLegal he'rdis 1975).
3i9Albany I. Rev. 799.
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are kept on them and how they are rewarded or penalized. There should, for instance, be
no interference with prisoners which involves any risk or disrespect or encroaches upon
the individual's fundamental rights. For if a prisoner sees his co-operation in an
experiment as a means of improving his lot, the direct or indirect pressure implied in
thiio situation invalidates the consent.
Where consent of the subjects themselves cannot be obtained, consent must be sought
from someone in authority, together -with written consent from an impartial person who
may act as an independent advocate. As a further protection, we recommend that
captive populations always have the power of veto over their participation in a research
project.
We receommend with respect to captive populations:
(1) that, in addition to consent of the authorities, the consent of the subjects themselves
be obtained;
(2) that, where it is not possible to obtain the informed consent of the subjects, the
written consent of an impartial person be obtained, in addition to the consent of the
authorities;
(3) that captive subjects always have the right and power to veto consent given by the
aut,,orities or an impartial person for their participation in the research;
(4) that special care be taken with respect to all other ethical principles where captive
populations are involved.

What emerges from a comparative study of the ethical and legal rules
applicable to non-therapeutic clinical reasearch in which experiments are
not expected to benefit the subject is the requirement of informed consent
freely given by the subject or his proxy or both plus a review of the project
by an independent review committee. This is a good approach to the

problem, although the non-professional members of such committee may
have difficulty deciding whether the risk to the subject is minimal.

III. CONCLUSIONS
Recent medical advances make it imperative to determine (a) the cases

in which consent should be legally effective and (b) what is meant by
legally effective consent.
In the medical. field, consent takes on a special importance. Most, if not
all of' us, have a vested interest in this issue, since so many people

undergo some form of surgical operation or at least some medical
treatment during the course of their lives. It would be frightening to think

that our bodies could be tampered with without our consent, and that
234
such an action would be lawful. As Peter Strauss writes:

Evn in our socialistic age the law of most Western democracies has retained its
individualistic spirit to such an extent that the decision whether he wants to be cured or
not is left to the patient. Therefore justification for the medical operation is still
fundamentally to be found in his consent. This, it is submitted, is the proper view.

However, this does not mean that every operation performed without the
patiert's consent should be illicit. It is preferable to say that if an
operation is performed against a patient's will, it is illicit. If an operation
is perFormed merely without the patient's consent, it may still be legally
justifiable. This would be the case in an emergency situation when the
patient is unconscious. The "individualistic spirit" mentioned by Strauss

is still preserved, in that it is sacrificed only when the public interest is
affected, for it is certainly in the public interest to preserve the high value
placed on human life. Similarly, it would be against the interests of our

liberal! society to uphold operations performed specifically against the
patient's will.
',34. Supra, n. 106 at 183.
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It is recommended that the criminal law and the civil law should
interfere as little as possible with the daily work of the medical profession
in order to encourage medical advances for the benefit of society in
general and the patient in particular.13 :5 A balanced formula must be
found which protects both the physician and his patient. The doctrine of
informed consent expressly and freely given seems to achieve this
balance provided its constituent elements are well defined and consent is
viewed as the expression of a responsible choice by the patient or subject,
and an ongoing process.
Assuming that there is a duty to inform, the criteria for informed
consent freely given must take into consideration (1) the status of the
person giving his or her consent (for instance, whether he is a patient, a
subject, an adult, a minor, or a prisoner) in order to insure that he or she
is a responsible patient or subject and that the choice which the consent
expresses is freely made, and (2) the nature of the contemplated procedure
(for instance, whether therapeutic or non-therapeutic or experimental) as
the type of information to be given the patient or subject depends upon it.
Thus, it would seem to be advisable to indicate the form consent should
take (for instance, in writing in the presence of two witnesses in order to
avoid any error as to the existence of consent on the part of the physician
or researcher) and the persons who can give a valid informed consent (for
instance, persons who are capable or discernment).
Informed consent is sufficient to protect an individual's health and
bodily integrity as well as his dignity. However, in ascertaining whether
the patient understands the proposed treatment or experiment and
assents voluntarily to its performance, it is the conduct of the physician
that must be judged rather than that of the patient or subject. If the
physician adjusts to the rules of informed consent he should not fear any
criminal or civil liability.
It is suggested that no differences should exist as to the effects of
informed consent between the private law and the criminal law. However,
the criminal law could determine the upper limits of the efficacy of
consent as an expression of public policy which would then be applicable
to the private law. This may be difficult to achieve in a federal state like
Canada because of the division of legislative powers.
As already noted, when consent is effective it removes the illicit
character of the act. Consent should have nothing to do with intent or
mens rea as it affects the objective not the subjective element of an
offence. Whether consent should be made a valid justification for a
particular act involves serious policy considerations. The protection of
public order and the fostering of individual freedom at times may conflict.
When the acts contemplated infringe private rights and interests only
and not those of the State or of society, consent should be a valid
justification recognized by the Criminal Code.
With respect to the right to life, it is suggested that article 14 of the
Criminal Code be modified to take into consideration the motive for
consenting to death. When the reasons for an offence are noble, a lesser
penalty should be imposed or the elements or nature of the offence should
be changed. Thus, in the case of voluntary euthanasia the penalty should
not be as severe as in the case of culpable homicide, although it may be
advisable to distinguish between the situation where death is ad:I,5.

,v Mcl'' in v W':r, xul)ra, i. 27 at 627 Ip'r (GCuld J:
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ministered at the request of the patient and the situation where it is
administered with his consent. This does not mean that voluntary or
involuntary euthanasia should be legalized. It is a matter of public
policy outside the scope of this article. On the other hand, it is submitted
that the California Natural Death Act could be worked into the Criminal
Code so as not to conflict with sections 14 and 212.
Also, a special section could be included in part I of the Criminal Code
dealing with consent as a cause of justification. For instance article 50 of
the Italian Penal Code provides that:
A person who damages the property or infringes a right with the consent of the person
or persons who may legally dispose of it does not commit an offence.

A person can only dispose of property or a right if its infringement is not directly
contr~ary to public order or public interest.

No valid consent can be given by a non emancipated minor under the age of 21 or
with respect to his extra patrimonial rights, by an emancipated minor or an insane
person.
Consent given by error, or as a result of violence, threats or fraud is not valid.

With respect to the right to physical and mental integrity, it is
suggesled that there is no need for special legislation. The doctrine of
informed consent freely given seems to be adequate. However, with
respect to non-therapeutic clinical research in which experiments are not
expected to benefit the subject but are designed to add to the understanding of normal and diseased states, it might be advisable to adopt
regulations somewhat similar to those in force in the United States with
respect to grants made under the authority of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. The testing of new drugs also requires special
rules. Actually, the various ethical rules of conduct considered earlier in
this ar icle appear to be adequate as they contain sufficient safeguards
for the patient or subject.
Peer review is important. It is suggested that involvement of the laity
in medical ethics should be kept at the minimum as it is questionable
whethexr the lay public is able to grapple more effectively with the
complex moral and scientific judgments about human experimentation.
However, the role of the laity may be important in determining whether
the conditions of informed and free consent have been met. Review by the
researcher's peers and guidelines for obtaining an informed and free
consent would seem to be sufficient in the case of clinical research. The
review would insure independent determination of the rights and welfare
of individuals involved in such clinical studies, the appropriateness of
methods used to secure their informed and free consent, and an
assessment of the risk-benefit ratio. Peer review can be much more
effective than laws and regulations provided precise procedural rules and
substantive standards are followed and applied in the review process.
As long as the patient or his representative is capable and under no
duress and has consented after being given a fair explanation of the
procedures to be followed, a description of possible discomforts and risks,
a description of possible benefits, a disclosure of alternative procedures,
an offer to answer all inquiries, and a clear enunciation of the patient's
freedom to withdraw from the study at any time, there is no reason for
invalidating such consent and holding the physician criminallly or civilly
liable. In conclusion, an effective way to protect the interests of patients
or subjects is to make sure that the physician will adjust to the
requirements of informed decision making.
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The doctrine of informed consent should not be pushed to such
extremes that hospitals will require consent from patients to use their
sweat, urine and feces for experimental purposes. Also, there should be
flexibility as to the amount of disclosure when therapeutic treatment is
involved and full disclosure would be detrimental to the health of the
patient. In such a case full disclosure should be made to the patient's
relatives or representatives without fear that this contributes a breach of
professional secret.
As noted previously, it is often difficult to determine when the
physician has a professional duty to inform his patient and when he
should obtain an expressed informed consent. Where should the line be
drawn between implied consent and the need for express informed
consent? Obviously, in the case of a routine visit or medical check-up
there is no need for an informed consent. However, consent must exist to
protect the physician against a possible charge of assault and battery
when examining the patient. In such a case consent is implied in the
physician-patient relationship.
The danger in enacting too many laws and regulations is that they
will inhibit scientific investigation and bring us back to medieval times
when new practices and procedures were abhorred. The best and probably
only guarantee of a patient or subject's rights is the integrity of his
physician.
On the private law side, the Civil Code of Quebec could be amended in
order to contain a special provision dealing with the effect of the victim's
consent upon the reparation of his damage in case of infringement of
rights that can be waived. The Civil Code or the common law should take
consent into consideration when the victim of a delict or quasi delict or of
a tort seeks reparation. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria is not fully
adequate.
For instance in Switzerland article 44 of the Code of Obligations
states:
Le juge peut r~duire les dommages intdr~ts, ou rnme n'en point allouer Iorsque la partie
l6sde a consentie la lksion ou lorsque des faits dont elle est responsable ont contribu6 A
crier le dommage, A raugmenter, ou qu'ils ont aggrav6 la situation du d6biteur.

This provision could be applied whether the liability of the actor is
contractual or delictual.

